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THREE MAY NOT BE A CROWD: THE CASE FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PLURAL MARRIAGE
Ronald C. Den Otter∗
ABSTRACT
This Article takes seriously the substantive due process and equal
protection arguments that support plural marriage (being able to marry more
than one person at the same time). While numerous scholars have written
about same-sex marriage, few of them have had much to say about marriages
among three or more individuals. As progressive, successful, and important as
the Marriage Equality Movement has been, it focuses on same-sex marriage at
the expense of other possible kinds of marriages that may be equally
worthwhile. The vast majority of Americans still do not discuss plural
marriage openly and fairly, as if the topic were taboo. One of the goals of this
Article is to convince readers that marriage in the future could be a much
more diverse institution that does a better job of meeting individual needs.
After all, one size may not fit all. Unfortunately, too often, scholars reduce
plural marriage to the exploitation of women and the abuse of children. This
approach makes it too easy to dismiss the possibility that a plural marriage
might work better than the alternatives for at least some individuals in some
circumstances.
Because the expansion of marriage to include same-sex couples is bound to
cover a broader range of marital relationships, lawmakers, judges, and the
rest of us eventually will have to decide which kinds of intimate relationships
will be accorded legal status and which kinds will be left out. Today, a
growing number of Americans reject the double standard when a state does
not treat same-sex couples the same as opposite-sex couples when it comes to
eligibility for marriage licenses. The strong dignity language of the recent
Windsor decision indicates that future courts will be more skeptical of the
rationale for limiting marriage to a man and a woman if it is predicated upon
demeaning sexual minorities. Another double standard, which is the focal
∗ Ronald C. Den Otter, Associate Professor, Political Science, California Polytechnic State University,
San Luis Obispo. J.D., University of Pennsylvania School of Law, 1992. Ph.D., UCLA, Political Science,
2003. I would like to thank Sonu Bedi, Elizabeth Brake, Matt Moore, Mark Goldfeder, the editors at the Emory
Law Journal, and my (only) wife, Grace Den Otter, for all of their help in making this Article possible.
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point of this Article, concerns why the state allows almost all couples to marry
for just about any personal reason that they happen to have. At the same time,
all states continue to refuse to recognize any plural union. Those who care
about gays and lesbians being discriminated against cannot ignore whether
those who would marry multiple partners, if they were allowed to do so, are
also being treated unfairly. The former kind of discrimination may be more
widespread and worse than the latter, but that does not mean the latter is
constitutionally permissible.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article is about the unconstitutionality of laws that limit civil marriage
to couples.1 As of this writing, even though numerous legal scholars have
contributed to the same-sex marriage debate, most legal scholars have been
reticent about marital multiplicity.2 The Marriage Equality Movement has
focused on same-sex marriage, and this focus, while understandable at this
historical moment, has come at the expense of other forms of marriage that
may be equally worthwhile. With about three-fourths of the states finally
legally recognizing marriage between two men or two women, it is about time
to contemplate the constitutional implications of requiring states to grant
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.3 Anyone who endorses the view that
government may not limit marriage to opposite-sex couples, either on
substantive due process or equal protection grounds, must be curious about
whether states may continue to prevent even fully informed, consenting adults
from marrying more than one person at the same time.
These days, it would be unusual to find a progressive that opposes any kind
of unequal legal treatment of sexual minorities. Even some conservatives have
seen the writing on the wall and have modified their positions accordingly.4
That said, most legal scholars would not see plural marriage in the same light.
As Eugene Volokh writes, “[I]t’s pretty clear that a state may choose not to

1

RONALD C. DEN OTTER, IN DEFENSE OF PLURAL MARRIAGE (forthcoming 2015).
However, there are some exceptions. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN
DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 197–98 (2008) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY
OF CONSCIENCE]; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 229–30 (2000) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT]; RICHARD A.
POSNER, SEX AND REASON 257–60 (1992); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1421–35
(2d ed. 1988); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence,
29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004); Sanford Levinson, Thinking About Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1049 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2110 (2005).
3 As of April 30, 2015, same-sex marriage exists in thirty-seven states—Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming—and in the District of Columbia. Marriage
Center, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/campaigns/marriage-center (last visited May 17, 2015); see
also Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Decide Marriage Rights for Gay Couples Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 2015, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/17/us/supreme-court-to-decide-whether-gaysnationwide-can-marry.html.
4 See Perry Bacon, Jr., Conservatives Increasingly Weary of Opposing Gay Marriage, NBC NEWS
(June 20, 2014, 4:49 pm), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/conservatives-increasingly-waryopposing-gay-marriage-n137046.
2
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recognize polygamous marriages.”5 Additionally, many progressives remain
reluctant to broach the plural marriage question, as if it were taboo. Their
refusal to do so was more defensible at a time when opponents of same-sex
marriage invoked the slippery slope to discredit such marriage by leading
Americans to believe that the legal recognition of same-sex marriage would
entail people’s marrying nonhuman animals and inanimate objects.6 The
purpose of this Article is to induce readers to consider the possibility that the
constitutional arguments against nonmonogamous marital alternatives are
much weaker than they may appear to be. At the very least, their doing so
would demand that they not boil down its wide variety of forms to the worst
aspects of patriarchal polygyny found in some religious or cultural traditions.
Antipolygamists have been allowed to frame what little debate there has been
about the topic to make it seem that being open to the idea of plural marriage is
the equivalent of endorsing the exploitation of women and the abuse of
children.7
The ongoing debate about same-sex marriage is not only about gay and
lesbian couples and their constitutional right not to be discriminated against; it
is also concerns the most appropriate legal definition of marriage in a country
that has exhibited an unfortunate tendency to discriminate invidiously against
different minorities. At stake is nothing less than discerning the meaning of the
United States Constitution when those who have different ideas about marital
relationships want the freedom to live unconventionally. In the last few years,
the debate over how marriage should be defined has pushed a growing number
of Americans to confront a problematic double standard in situations where a
state refuses to accord same-sex couples the same constitutional right to
marriage that their opposite-sex counterparts already may exercise. The strong
dignity language of the recent Windsor decision, several lower courts’
subsequent interpretation of it, and the resulting scholarly discussion of the
meaning of animus for constitutional purposes indicate that future judges could

5 Eugene Volokh, Crime to Conduct Same-Sex or Polygamous Marriage Ceremony?, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/14/crimeto-conduct-same-sex-or-polygamous-marriage-ceremony/.
6 See, e.g., Dan Amira, Rand Paul Walks Back Suggestion that Gay Marriage Will Lead to Interspecies
Marriage, N.Y. MAGAZINE (June 26, 2013, 4:54 p.m.), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/06/randpaul-gay-marriage-animal-human.html.
7 See, e.g., Shoshana Grossbard, Polygamy is Bad for Women, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE
(Dec. 17, 2013, 6:39 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/12/17/should-plural-marriage-belegal/polygamy-is-bad-for-women.
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be more skeptical of the reasoning behind restricting marriage to a man and a
woman if such a restriction is predicated upon demeaning sexual minorities.8
Another double standard, which is less visible yet equally disconcerting,
involves why the state only allows couples to marry. Those who care about
gays and lesbians being discriminated against cannot ignore whether those who
would marry multiple partners, if they were allowed to do so, are also being
treated impermissibly under the Constitution. The former kind of
discrimination may be worse than the latter, but that is not the issue. As the
debate over the meaning of marriage continues, those who oppose plural
marriage can be expected to draw upon some of the arguments that
traditionalists have deployed against marriage between people of the same
gender. In articulating their normative constitutional view, they will have to do
more than consult a dictionary, refer to religious understandings, conduct
survey research, embrace “tradition,” investigate how most people happen to
use the “m” word, put forth empirically unfounded claims, or generalize from
outliers. In the face of this double standard, progressives could (1) change their
minds and reject a constitutional right to same-sex marriage (or its equivalent
on equal protection grounds) or (2) attempt to defend the constitutionality of
unequal legal treatment of polygamists and polyamorists who would marry if
they could. In the past, those who favored same-sex marriage hesitated to align
themselves with those who advocated decriminalizing polygamy or legally
recognizing plural marriages. Instead, they went out of their way to distinguish
sharply between discrimination against gays and lesbians and discrimination
against polygamists.9
However, there must be a legally relevant difference between the two kinds
of marriage or else the state must cease to privilege monogamous marriage. In
2015, fewer Americans believe that states may put their stamp of approval on
opposite-sex marriages to the detriment of same-sex ones to validate
heterosexuality.10 As it turns out, some of the most compelling reasons that
advocates of same-sex marriage offer in the name of such marriage also
support the option of plural marriage. The slope from same-sex to plural
marriage may be slipperier than they realize in the sense that some of the same
reasons, like respecting marital choice and promoting equal treatment, which
8

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013).
See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 280–
81 (1999).
10 See Justin McCarthy, Same-Sex Marriage Support Reaches New High at 55%, GALLUP (May 21,
2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/169640/sex-marriage-support-reaches-new-high.aspx.
9
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figure so prominently in defense of same-sex marriage, are equally applicable
to being able to marry more than one person simultaneously. If progressives
reject their constitutional equivalence, they must explain why the state may
treat the two types of marriage differently without acting unconstitutionally.
This explanation would aim at establishing that numerical limitations are
justified in a way that those based on sexual orientation (or gender) are not.
Not only have they failed to do so as of this writing, they almost always draw a
bead on polygyny as if it were the only form that a plural marriage could
possibly take. Those who concern themselves with treating everyone as fairly
as possible should not be indifferent to other, more hidden manifestations of
marital discrimination, particularly when a plural marriage could be same-sex,
bisexual, or asexual. This Article argues that for constitutional purposes, the
legal definition of marriage in each state must include the option of plural
marriage. By not making marriage considerably more inclusive, without
adequate justification, the state fails to accept the marital choices of all adults
and treat them equally. As such, states that issue marriage licenses to couples
also must give them to “plural marriage enthusiasts” so that they can form a
multi-person marriage.11
This Article shall be divided into the following Parts: (1) the first Part puts
the topic of plural marriage into a legal context by clarifying the relevant
terminology and articulating how the ongoing debate over same-sex marriage
in this country relates to whether states only have to recognize monogamous
marriages; (2) the second Part discusses reasonable concerns about how
women are treated in polygynous relationships and distinguishes between two
kinds of gender equality: internal (the interpersonal dynamics of the intimate
relationship) and external (how the law treats the relationship) because
standard critiques of plural marriage, which almost always target polygyny,
conflate the two types; (3) the third Part spells out worries about child
development in families with “thruples” or “moresomes,” explains why such
worries are overstated, and suggests that parental multiplicity may be a
superior parenting arrangement; (4) the fourth Part argues for the value of
marital choice on substantive due process grounds by drawing on not only
constitutional doctrine but also on well-known constitutional cases; (5) the
fifth Part advances the view that equal protection requires states not to
discriminate against plural marriage enthusiasts by denying them marriage
licenses; and (6) the sixth Part summarizes the possible adverse consequences
11 Sonu Bedi refers to them as “plural marriage enthusiasts.” SONU BEDI, BEYOND RACE, SEX,
SEXUAL ORIENTATION 236–44 (2013).
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DEN OTTER GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

5/27/2015 2:13 PM

THREE MAY NOT BE A CROWD

1983

of judicial recognition of a constitutional right to plural marriage and
elaborates on why fears about the judiciary’s moving the country in a
particular normative direction usually are not as compelling as they seem to be.
The Article concludes with some thoughts on why ordinary Americans may
begin to discuss plural marriage with the kind of care that the topic deserves
sooner rather than later.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Terminology
Anthropologists tell us that “polygyny” is a man with multiple wives,
“polyandry” is a woman with multiple husbands, and “group marriage” is any
combination of three or more persons.12 “Polyamory” also covers multi-person
intimate unions.13 “Polyfidelity” underscores how individual choice and
equality could characterize such a relationship.14 I will use “polygamy” when
more than two adults consider themselves to be a unit, are not legally married,
and each of them is physically intimate with at least one of the other persons,
to highlight the open sexual nonexclusivity that characterizes intimate
relationships with multiple persons. Approximately 500,000 polygamous
households exist in the United States.15 Fundamentalist Latter-day Saints
(FLDS) polygamists comprise as many as 60,000 of them.16 Polygynous living
arrangements appear in Muslim immigrant communities as well.17 The fallacy
in equating plural marriage with FLDS polygyny (or any other variation, of
which there are many) lies in the fact that such an action usually ends the
conversation before it even has a chance to begin. In doing so, antipolygamists
invoke memories of sociopathic cult figures and then make it almost
impossible to take seriously the possibility that any multi-person relationship
could be morally unobjectionable. Only a small number of FLDS practice
polygyny.18 Polygyny is just one of the multiple forms of plural marriage, and
12

MIRIAM KOKTVEDGAARD ZEITZAN, POLYGAMY: A CROSS-CULTURAL ANALYSIS 3 (2008).
See DEBORAH ANAPOL, POLYAMORY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: LOVE AND INTIMACY WITH
MULTIPLE PARTNERS (2010).
14 Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering Polyamory, 31 CAP. U. L.
REV. 439, 452 (2003).
15 SHERIF GIRGIS, RYAN T. ANDERSON & ROBERT P. GEORGE, WHAT IS MARRIAGE? MAN AND WOMAN:
A DEFENSE 51 (2012).
16 ZEITZAN, supra note 12, at 89.
17 JANET BENNION, POLYGAMY IN PRIMETIME: MEDIA, GENDER, AND POLITICS IN MORMON
FUNDAMENTALISM 7 (2012).
18 Id.
13
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not all polygynous relationships are dysfunctional or involve crimes. Even if
polygyny became more widespread and more states were to let people marry
more than one person at the same time, the sky would not fall.
FLDS polygynous “marriages” continue to serve as the archetype for plural
marriage. To confine ourselves to that example is to impair our thinking about
the forms that such marriage could take in a society that did not force such
persons to conceal their unconventional intimate relationships. It is
unreasonable to believe that the number of polygynous marriages would
explode if women were suddenly allowed to marry a man who is already
married, especially if they had more marital options, including nonsexual ones
rooted in a close friendship or caretaking. The insinuation that all polygynous
marriages are like those of Warren Jeffs or Winston Blackmore is more than a
rhetoric cheap shot; it exploits prejudices against religious minorities and
non-Western immigrant communities and fear of difference more generally.
The typical FLDS polygynous “marriage” does not encourage other felonies.19
When someone commits serious crimes, then of course he or she should be
prosecuted, notwithstanding whether an intimate relationship contains more
than two persons. The proper legislative response to problems that may arise
more often in such situations is regulation, not prohibition. The status quo,
where states permit polygynous cohabitation and criminalize polygynous
“marriages” but rarely enforce laws against them is virtually incoherent. It is
intelligible only if one cares about symbolism or wants to empower
prosecutors to charge a defendant with additional crimes to improve their
bargaining position during plea negotiations.
Unfortunately, many critics of plural marriage have been allowed to argue
from irrelevant extremes for such a long time. Their ability to get away with
such a tactic has contributed to the popular belief that a plural marriage could
not be loving or caring. Not only is this view demonstrably false, it seems to
draw nourishment from the underlying but unwarranted belief that
monogamous intimate relationships always are superior to their polygamous
and polyamorous counterparts. This double standard has not been satisfactorily
defended. Marriage does not have to be about sexual gratification or
procreation; it also can contain many other sorts of intimacy that can be
expressed in different ways. The participants of a plural marriage may find
such a relationship to be more emotionally satisfying or more consistent with
their conceptions of “the good life.” In a family environment that has multiple
19

Id. at xvi.
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caregivers, a more efficient division of domestic labor, and greater financial
stability, children, the elderly, and the disabled may be more likely to receive
the care that they need.
When referring to being married to more than one person simultaneously,
this Article uses “plural marriage” to eschew the negative preconceptions
associated with patriarchal polygyny. This term covers any legal status where
at least three persons constitute a single marital unit, notwithstanding its
configuration, gender composition, or interpersonal dynamics. For the
purposes of this Article, then, polygamy is an intimate relationship among
three or more adults that the state does not recognize as a marriage or its legal
equivalent. The only difference between polygamy and a plural marriage is
that the state recognizes the latter as a legal status. The definition of marriage
that this Article claims to be constitutionally mandated would dramatically
alter the current legal meaning of marriage by covering a much wider variety
of intimate relationships. With this new definition of marriage in place,
irrespective of their gender, two or more adult siblings or close friends could
marry each (or one) another. Such marriage still could be reasonably regulated.
To argue against numerical restrictions is not to argue against all restrictions,
some of which may be valid. After all, no thoughtful person takes seriously the
view that the legal recognition of different kinds of plural marriages would
enable adults to marry children, animals, or inanimate objects, which are
incapable of giving legal consent.
B. The Double Standard
At best, the topic of plural marriage is an afterthought in the ongoing
debate about same-sex marriage. Most participants, who vocally advocate for
same-sex marriage, assume that the Constitution does not protect the right to
plural marriage (or its equivalent on equal protection grounds).20 Thus, they
must distinguish same-sex marriage from plural marriage in defending a
constitutional right to the former without proving too much and thereby
unintentionally creating a right to the latter. When it comes to two-person
marriage, opposite sex or same sex, the law never concerns itself with the
personal reasons that a couple has for marrying as long as the marriage is not
fraudulent for immigration purposes. With that exception, the personal reasons
20 See, e.g., Hema Chatlani, Article, In Defense of Marriage: Why Same-Sex Marriage Will Not Lead Us
Down a Slippery Slope Toward the Legalization of Polygamy, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 101 (2006); Elizabeth
Larcano, Note, A “Pink” Herring: The Prospect of Polygamy Following the Legalization of Same-Sex
Marriage, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1065 (2006).

DEN OTTER GALLEYSPROOFS2

1986

5/27/2015 2:13 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1977

for a monogamous marriage are assumed to be good enough to justify legal
recognition. By contrast, the personal reasons for a plural marriage are
assumed to be so bad that they could not possibly be sufficient, even when one
or both persons are fully informed about the nature and possible consequences
of the legal relationship that they would like to form. Usually, this double
standard escapes the scrutiny that it should receive. This state of affairs should
not go unnoticed when so few people believe that the state may vet the
personal reasons of couples applying for marriage licenses, no matter how
silly, trivial, or idiotic they might be. Constitutionally, for couples, the
meaning of marriage is left to competent adults who can decide for themselves
what they want their marital relationship to be.
Unless one dogmatically subscribes to the view that all monogamous
marriages are better along all dimensions than all multi-person intimate
relationships, little imagination is required to appreciate how a plural marriage
could be happier, healthier, and more conducive to human flourishing. Not
only is that view demonstrably false, it fails to account for the fact that
different people have different ideas about intimacy and what is most
important to them more generally. In the past, typical media coverage of plural
marriage only involved law enforcement raids on polygynous compounds and
stories of cultist behavior, exploitation, and abuse,21 leading most Americans to
conclude that plural marriage can be reduced to other illegal or immoral
behaviors. However, just because some polygamous relationships are
polygynous does not mean that all of them are or would be in a different
marital regime. And just because some of the polygynous relationships are
dysfunctional or tainted by criminality does not mean that all of them are under
all circumstances. If a state were to permit plural marriages, it still could
continue to impose reasonable restrictions, like consent and age requirements,
and prosecute people for crimes like forcible or statutory rape, underage
marriage, incest (between an adult and a minor), intimate partner violence,
child abuse or neglect, tax evasion, or welfare fraud. The relevant bases of
comparison cannot be the worst forms of polygyny and ideal forms of
monogamy.
For the most part, Americans do not discuss plural marriage with the kind
of sophistication that it calls for, but that state of affairs seems to be changing

21 See, e.g., Michelle Roberts & Paul J. Weber, Texas Ranger Says Raid of Warren Jeffs’ FLDS
Compound Vindicated, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 11, 2011, available at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/
700170119/Texas-Ranger-says-raid-of-Warren-Jeffs-FLDS-compound-vindicated.html.
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slowly but surely. In the future, marriage could be a much more diverse
institution that more effectively meets individual needs. People are similar in
some respects and different in other respects, and considerable variance is to be
expected. Americans are becoming more accustomed to the possibility that it
may not be inappropriate for people to have an unconventional, nonmarital
intimate relationship when those involved are consenting adults who are
completely honest with one another. There is a world of moral difference
between an open marriage and infidelity, where the person who is not sexually
exclusive conceals his or her behavior. Those who prefer monogamy should
not summarily dismiss the likelihood that a plural marriage might work better
than the alternatives for at least some individuals in some circumstances.
At present, open marriages exist, swinging occurs, adultery is not
uncommon, alternative lifestyles are not as hidden as they used to be, the
meaning of sexual identity is being contested, transgender persons are less
likely to be hidden from view, and premarital sexual activity is less likely to be
condemned as immoral provided that neither person is too young nor in an
exclusive relationship. In an era of no-fault divorce, almost all Americans put
up with “serial polygamy” in which many people have more than one marital
partner during their lifetimes. In 2013, a U.S. district court invalidated part of
Utah’s anti-bigamy law.22 In the wake of this judicial decision, the New York
Times broached the plural-marriage question.23 The more charitable media
portrayal of polygamy, in conjunction with the ongoing battle over same-sex
marriage, finally has prompted academics and others to discuss the quality of
the rationale for not extending the right of marriage beyond couples. After all,
it could be true that limiting the size of a marriage is as constitutionally
problematic as restricting marriage to same-race or opposite-sex couples.
II. GENDER INEQUALITY
Constitutionally, same-sex marriage is an easier case than its plural
counterpart.24 As of this writing, public opinion polls indicate that 55%
Americans accept the former.25 For most scholars, none of the constitutional
arguments against refusing to let same-sex couples marry are close to
22

Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013).
Should Plural Marriage Be Legal?, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Dec. 17, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/12/17/should-plural-marriage-be-legal.
24 For my characterization of same-sex marriage as an easy case, see RONALD C. DEN OTTER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN AN AGE OF MORAL PLURALISM 245–61 (2009).
25 McCarthy, supra note 10.
23
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compelling. Such arguments often contain controversial moral (or religious)
and unproven empirical premises that people can (and do) reasonably reject. It
is becoming increasingly evident that such arguments no longer can justify a
conception of marriage that excludes gays and lesbians, are predicated on the
superiority of heterosexuality, and cannot be squared with a commitment to
legal equality. However a person casts her opposition to same-sex marriage, it
will be difficult for her to maintain that how gays and lesbians are being
treated satisfies the constitutional requirement of equal protection. When
opponents of same-sex marriage contend that opposite-sex marriage is
inherently superior, they are probably wrong, empirically and morally. Even if
they were right about that, they still would be advancing a particular
conception of marriage that would be, at the very least, constitutionally
controversial inasmuch as the rationale for unequal treatment is not supposed
to reflect an evaluation of the merits of such marriages. Their other option is to
identify other state interests that excluding gays and lesbians from marriage are
supposed to serve, which is not promising when the connection between those
potential interests (such as promoting responsible procreation) and allowing
same-sex couples to marry is so attenuated.26 Once the debate is framed in
terms of freedom of marital choice and marital equality, the game is over for
opponents of same-sex marriage.
By contrast, plural marriage raises legitimate concerns about gender
equality and whether women actually choose such marital arrangements.
Probably the most serious objection to creating a constitutional right to plural
marriage (or its equivalent on equal protection grounds) would be that to
permit such marriage is to subordinate some women and condemn them to
unhappiness or misery. Recently in Canada, the Bala Report attempted to
document the kinds of harms that traditional polygyny inflicts upon women.27
What understandably makes many progressive academics uneasy with the very
idea of a person’s marrying more than one person at the same time, probably
more than any other single factor, concerns the extent to which women in

26 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 999–1000 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“The evidence
supports two points which together show Proposition 8 does not advance any of the identified interests:
(1) same-sex parents are of equal quality, and (2) Proposition 8 does not make it more likely that opposite-sex
couples will marry and raise offspring biologically related to both parents.”); see also JO BECKER, FORCING
THE SPRING: INSIDE THE FIGHT FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY 215–18 (2014).
27 Nicholas Bala et al., An International Review of Polygamy: Legal and Policy Implications for Canada,
in POLYGAMY IN CANADA: LEGAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN: A COLLECTION OF
POLICY RESEARCH REPORTS 7–19 (2005).
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traditional polygynous relationships never would be equals.28 Even if most
polygynous marriages did not seriously harm women, they still are likely to be
unequal in certain important respects (such as their division of domestic labor),
and that likelihood could support the state’s not according them legal status.
This objection presupposes not only that such women should not be able to
choose an unequal marital relationship even when they are as fully informed as
they can be about its likely nature but also conditions the public that they
would have better lives in a different, more equal living arrangement (e.g., if
they only married one person or did not marry at all). It is hard to imagine that
the kind of woman who would choose a traditional polygynous marriage over
the alternatives would find herself in a more equal setting if she were denied
that option and then opted for a two-person marriage or polygynous
cohabitation, as if both of them could be assumed to be sufficiently egalitarian.
To deny an adult woman any kind of plural marriage, including a polygynous
one, is not necessarily to save her from subordination in her personal life. After
all, there is no way to know in advance what she would do if she were denied
her first choice and had to settle for something else, which may not be
preferable.
Another response is to deny that if women had a menu of marital options,
they would select polygyny even if some of them in fact would do so, probably
for religious or cultural reasons. A plural marriage could be same-sex, could be
polyandrous, or could be asexual. Thus, many of them may not resemble the
kind of polygyny that has raised understandable worries in the past about the
welfare of women in such living situations. Additionally, it seems improbable
that large numbers of American women would select such an arrangement in
the midst of an expanded range of marital options, coupled with less social and
economic pressure on them to be a part of a more traditional, inegalitarian
marital relationship. A woman might prefer a same-sex or platonic thruple,
quad, or moresome over an opposite-sex monogamous marriage that
incorporates an unequal, gendered division of labor and lacks shared
decisionmaking. If gender equality is paramount, then a polyamorous
arrangement could be the most promising option.

28

See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD
Cohen et al. eds., 1999).

FOR WOMEN? 7, 9–10 (Joshua
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As philosophers would say, gender inequality is a contingent, rather than a
conceptual, feature of polygamy.29 How unequal any marriage is turns out to
be a function of its particulars. Alternatively, proponents of plural marriage
may concede that even if most of these marriages were more often than not
unequal, they would not be demonstrably worse in this way than monogamous
marriages are and, consequently, should not be rejected on that basis. Even if
most plural marriages were much worse in terms of gender equality, such an
objection still would not necessarily be decisive. The state’s interest in
promoting equality in personal relationships, known as internal equality, would
have to override the importance of marital choice. This trade-off must be
confronted, and those who are convinced that the former trumps the latter must
defend their view without resorting to negative stereotypes about what all
polygynous relationships are like. In Martha Nussbaum’s words, “[T]o rule
that [opposite-sex] marriage as such should be illegal on the grounds that it
reinforces male dominance would be an excessive intrusion upon liberty, even
if one should believe marriage irredeemably unequal.”30 An individual cannot
simply play the gender-equality card as if the mere fact that some plural
marriages would be inegalitarian warrants denying legal recognition to all of
its conceivable forms. Indeed, it is counterintuitive to ban unequal marriages
but permit those that are otherwise dysfunctional, including violent ones,
unless one is preoccupied with internal equality. A marriage could be
sufficiently egalitarian yet lack love, caring, honesty, and other kinds of
intimacy. One would have to be able to prove that the promotion of internal
equality overrides the importance of protecting marital choice. That is easier
said than done when all of us want at least some space to shape our intimate
relationships to fit our idiosyncratic ends. In the context of intimate
relationships, some of us may care more about internal equality than others.
The above concerns about the unequal treatment of women in polygamous
relationships have not arrived upon the scene recently. In the notorious
Reynolds decision, the Court endorsed the double standard that many
Americans still accept: monogamous intimate relationships tend to be equal
enough, whereas polygamous ones always fall short.31 Even if a traditional
polygynous marriage is likely to be less egalitarian than a monogamous one,
though, it does not mean that the former is intrinsically superior to the latter.
29 Cheshire Calhoun, Who’s Afraid of Polygamy? Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage Advocacy from the
History of Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1023, 1038 (2005).
30 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 295 (1999).
31 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
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All intimate relationships are probably more equal in some respects than in
others. An opposite-sex marriage may be more equal when it comes to
domestic labor compared with another given marriage but less equal when it
comes to, say, familial decisionmaking regarding the children, finances, or
whose career is a priority. Current family law tries to account for what each
person wants and, in doing so, acknowledges the importance of personal
choice, flexibility, and familial diversity. More than a few people could be
more emotionally satisfied in a multi-person relationship.32 Polyamorous
marriages can serve as examples of how monogamous relationships and
marriages could be improved.33 At minimum, those who oppose plural
marriage will have to spell out their objections to expanding the legal
definition of marriage without falling back upon anti-Mormon or anti-Muslim
prejudices, negative stereotypes, questionable data, or overly sentimental views
about monogamous marriage.
The least controversial meaning of internal equality in any marriage is that
power is evenly distributed in the collective decisionmaking (including over
finances), and the couple, thruple, quad, or moresome has a more or less equal
division of domestic labor and the same right to exit the relationship with an
equitable division of the marital property and the same custody and visitation
rights in the event that they have children. American family law tries to ensure
that neither person, in a two-person marriage, is too disadvantaged when the
marriage ends.34 The assumption about the state’s aforementioned interest in
promoting equality in personal relationships animates feminist critiques of
plural marriage. Although polygynous marriages may undermine gender
equality, such inequality may have other causes that the state can address
through regulatory schemes without condemning all plural marriages. If after
experimenting with such marriages, it turns out that they do not further gender
inequality or only have a negligible impact, the case for a constitutional right
to plural marriage would be even more compelling.
Not all feminists are opposed to plural marriage in the abstract. An
increasing number of them are much more open to the idea than they used to

32 See David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 81 (1997);
Emens, supra note 2, at 284.
33 For example, advocates of polyamory call attention to the social importance of its five main principles:
self-knowledge, radical honesty, consent, self-possession, and the avoidance of emotions like jealousy. See
Emens, supra note 2, at 320–30.
34 WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 525
(5th ed. 2011).
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be. Cheshire Calhoun was one of the first feminist theorists to detach polygyny
from its background conditions to show that plural marriages are not invariably
inegalitarian.35 According to Martha Nussbaum, polygamy may be acceptable
under some circumstances.36 She concedes that “[p]olygamy . . . is a
structurally unequal practice.”37 In a traditional polygynous relationship, an
asymmetry of power exists between the man and his wives, given its hub and
wheel structure, where the man is romantically involved with everyone else but
none of the women have that sort of relationship with one another, even though
they may bond in other ways. The sole husband can marry other women,
divorce his wives at will, and exercise other kinds of control over them with no
accountability, creating a situation that invites the abuse of his power. For this
reason, Nussbaum’s defense of polygamy is qualified, as it should be. She ties
it to the possibility that plural marriages also could be polyandrous. For her,
the best argument against polygamy is that “men are permitted plural
marriages, and women are not.”38
The standard legal position against plural marriage, then, is predicated on
the view that the state has an important or compelling interest in ensuring
decent treatment in intimate relationships. Nobody disputes that the state may
enact laws to reduce intimate partner violence, spousal rape, and other
sociopathic behaviors. The state also may bring into existence a
community-property regime or equitable divorce laws requiring spousal and
child support to reduce the likelihood that women and children are rendered
economically vulnerable upon dissolution of the marriage. The state should
intervene when one person is unquestionably harming another, even if they
happen to be married or living together, and not ignore the fact that the
husband frequently takes his earning power with him in the event of divorce.
Nobody should have to remain in an unhappy or dangerous marriage because
becoming single again is not a financially viable option.
That said, even though the state may legislate to require employers to grant
parental leave, to subsidize childcare, or to prevent sexual harassment in the
workplace without violating the Constitution, laws that try to force equality
upon those who would prefer to have an unequal marital relationship raise a
related but distinct issue that calls for more subtle treatment than it usually
receives. Because the Constitution shields choice in the most important aspects
35
36
37
38

Calhoun, supra note 29, at 1023–41.
NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 2, at 230.
NUSSBAUM, supra note 30, at 98.
NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 2, at 197.
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of their personal lives from unjustified legislative infringement,39 Americans
ought to be able to choose to have an unequal marital relationship, at least until
it dissolves. The well-known feminist challenge to the public–private
dichotomy cannot entail that all behavior is subject to the authority of the state,
including every single aspect of how partners relate to each other in their
personal lives, because that understanding would leave no room for the
personal freedom that all of us want to have. Legally, their vulnerability while
the marriage lasts is one thing; their vulnerability after it ends is another. In a
manner of speaking, to claim that people may not choose to have an unequal
relationship is to undermine the constitutional principle that legislative
majorities should not interfere with people’s most intimate decisions unless it
has no other choice. In this respect, the American constitutional tradition is
semi-libertarian. Absent harm or the serious risk of it, personal choice is called
for. People are largely left alone to have the kind of marriage that they want
even when it is unequal in some respects. At present, a spouse cannot have her
right of support enforced until she is legally separated or divorced.40
Nor does a marriage license require any specific conduct from either
party.41 With few exceptions, family law is indifferent toward hierarchy and
morally questionable behaviors more generally unless harm occurs. As
Nussbaum remarks, “It just seems an intolerable infringement of liberty for the
state to get involved in dictating how people do their dishes.”42 In sum, there
are constitutional limits when it comes to how the state may attempt to regulate
the behavior that takes place within a marriage or intimate relationship. The
issue is what those limits are. The state cannot force a particular kind of
intimate relationship upon women who desire to follow more traditional
gender practices. In a liberal society, women are free to adopt whatever
identity they want and live accordingly, even when their decision leaves
something to be desired by feminist standards. Nor can the law force men to
have more progressive attitudes. What the state can do, though, is legislate
against the adverse consequences of such personal decisions when one or both
persons want to end their marital relationship. No American lawmaking body

39 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding a law that criminalized consensual sexual
conduct between to adults to be unconstitutional); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (recognizing the
right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(finding that a law prohibiting the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally intruded on the right to privacy).
40 NUSSBAUM, supra note 30, at 98.
41 Id.
42 NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 2, at 280.
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or court ever has conditioned the constitutional right to marriage on its actual
or apparent equality while it lasts.
As a result, opponents of plural marriage must show that the kind of gender
inequality that is likely to exist in a plural marriage is not only unique but
worse than other kinds that our society already tolerates. A just constitutional
democracy is not committed to fostering internal equality at all costs, as in
without regard to other constitutional principles. Exactly the same concern
arises with respect to any familial relationship that is rooted in a gendered
division of labor or other sexist beliefs and behaviors. Such an argument
against plural marriage proves too much: it is not evident why most
multi-person relationships cannot be reformed along egalitarian lines if their
monogamous counterparts can be so reformed unless one is convinced that
their structure alone renders them irredeemably inegalitarian.
III. THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN
When the public debate over plural marriage begins, critics will allege that
such marriage is not conducive to the welfare of children. The vast majority of
social scientists have come to believe that opposite-sex parents are not
inherently superior to same-sex parents.43 Other variables, which are
independent of gender of each person in the couple, like continuity of care,
have a much greater impact on the psychological development of children. As
Elizabeth Brake notes, different kinds of families, including less conventional
ones, can provide such care.44 The quality of the parenting in particular
instances depends on the ability, resources, and willingness of their
caregiver(s) to meet the various needs of the children. In the real world, the
most apt comparison is among various suboptimal options. Ultimately, the
view that plural marriage will undermine the welfare of children cannot be
successfully defended because (a) children can be protected more directly from
harm, (b) the presence of more than two adults in a household may improve the
quality of parenting more often than not, and (c) even if a substantial majority
of multi-personal arrangements are not superior, the alternatives may be
worse.45 If one takes a somewhat different tack by contending that plural
43

See CARLOS A. BALL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND CHILDREN: A TALE OF HISTORY, SOCIAL SCIENCE,

AND LAW (2014).
44 Elizabeth Brake,

Minimal Marriage: What Political Liberalism Implies for Marriage Law, 120 ETHICS
302, 318 (2010).
45 It is important to keep in mind that the relevant basis of comparison may not be two opposite-sex
parents. In many cases, the alternative may be financially and emotionally worse for the children. On this
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marital arrangements set a bad example for children, then one has to deal with
the unfortunate fact that couples set bad examples for their own children (and
for other children) through behaviors like alcohol and drug abuse, violence,
manipulation, racism, sexism, homophobia, intolerance, out-of-control
gambling, irresponsible spending, infidelity, callousness, excessive attention to
physical appearance, and crass consumerism.
Americans never have been and never will be licensed to be parents.46 A
couple assumes legal responsibility for their children simply by procreating.
Whether either individual has the minimum skills, the financial resources, or
mental health to parent competently is beside the point. As a generalization,
most parents are good in some respects and bad in others. They are not legally
required to pay any attention to their children’s wishes, respect their autonomy,
discern and nurture their talents, or even care about what they want to do with
their lives. They may (and often do) foist their visions of the good life upon
them. Provided that they do not abuse or neglect them, they can interact with
them just about however they please, for better or for worse. In the debate over
same-sex marriage, it is not hard to appreciate why the mantra of saving the
children has been so effective. In principle, Americans rarely oppose anything
that is supposed to improve the lives of children.
However, upon closer inspection, “saving the children” begins to look too
much like a rhetorical technique used to make it seem as if favoring the legal
option of plural marriage would be tantamount to indifference to how children
are raised. At present, marriage privatizes dependency.47 The legal duties that
parents have towards their children already have been detached from the
marital relationship. After all, many biological parents hardly live up to the
ideal. Even if, more often than not, two married, biological parents constitute
the best parenting arrangement, individualized assessment still would be called
for inasmuch as child welfare remains the overarching concern. Americans
should care less about the form of a marriage and more about its particular
dynamics, regardless of its configuration, if what is at stake concerns how
children are being prepared for adulthood. Not many of us think that bad
parents should be automatically divorced if they are married and prohibited
point, see Mark Goldfeder & Elisabeth Sheff, Children of Polyamorous Families: A First Empirical Look, 5 J.
L. & SOC. DEVIANCE 150, 166–69 (2013).
46 However, the most compelling argument probably ever formulated in support of licensing parents is
found in Hugh Lafollette, Licensing Parents, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 182 (1980).
47 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 108 (2004);
Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, in JUST MARRIAGE 46 (Mary Lyndon Shanley ed., 2004).
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from marrying and having children ever again. A return to a fault divorce
regime may not benefit children if that policy change fails to take into account
the costs of preserving marriages that are characterized by conflict.48 In some
cases, parents who stay together are making a horrific mistake. The burdens
that women and children may bear if it were harder for couples to end their
marriages cannot be wished away.49 The main advantages of two parents,
compared with a single parent, lie in higher income and more thorough
supervision.50 At minimum, policymakers should avoid the kind of
sentimentality that prevents clear-headed, empirically sophisticated, and
morally nuanced analysis of the familial conditions under which children
typically thrive.
This child-welfare rationale for not permitting same-sex marriage may
extend to polygamy. If multi-person relationships are bad for children, then
that is another argument against legal recognition of such relationships. On the
one hand, those who oppose plural marriage still can play the child-welfare
card by insisting that plural marriage is not an ideal environment for children
even if it does not increase the likelihood that they will be abused or
neglected.51 On the other hand, children may be loved and cared for in
unconventional families provided that their caregivers have the necessary skills
and the motivation to use them. Three or more parental figures could be
advantageous in most situations. Adolescents may benefit from having more
than two adults to talk to about their lives and from whom they can receive
advice. It is probably fair to say that most children and young adults are more
inclined to discuss important issues with one parent rather than the other, and
some of them may not feel comfortable sharing any aspect of their personal
lives, like their problems, fears, and self-doubts, with either parent. Recently,
the state of California enacted legislation that allows children to have more
than two legal parents.52 The presence of multiple parental figures not only
reflects the existence of blended families; it also probably would benefit
children more often than not due to better coordination in their efforts to
nurture their children and provide for their emotional and material needs.
48 JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY VALUES IN THE POSTMODERN
AGE 78–80 (1996).
49 FINEMAN, supra note 47, at 87.
50 NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE
LAW 74 (2008).
51 See, e.g., BHIKHU PAREKH, RETHINKING MULTICULTURALISM: CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND POLITICAL
THEORY 290 (2000).
52 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West Supp. 2015).
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At present, the sample size of polygamous and polyamorous families is too
small to generate any reliable results about how well “poly parents” parent.53
As such, the jury is still out. Some vocal critics of polygamy concede that more
data on contemporary polygamous families is needed before how they impact
children can be evaluated.54 This much is certain: the empirical case against
plural marriage on child welfare grounds has not yet come close to being
corroborated by the evidence if the burden of proof lies with those who allege
the children cannot flourish with more than two parental figures. It may not
take an entire village to raise a child but it stands to reason that, other things
being equal, parental multiplicity may be even more conducive to meeting
children’s needs. In fact, the existence of more than two caregivers may turn
out to be the superior parenting arrangement.
Other critics of polygamy maintain that the practice facilitates child abuse
and that the state should be able to ban it to shield children from such harm.
The trouble with this view is that (1) parenting can be detached from marriage
or marriage-like relationships, and (2) almost all people can practice polygamy
without abusing or neglecting the children. Utah, which has a history of
persecuting certain polygynous families, leaves such families alone unless
serious crimes occur. Under its penal code, criminal liability only results from
the participants’ trying to marry in a private ceremony or representing
themselves as being married.55 Even if it could be proven that children who
grow up in polygamous households are more at risk of being abused or
neglected than those who grow up in a more traditional family, it is not
acceptable to proscribe an otherwise legitimate practice merely because it
“tends to encourage” other kinds of crimes.56 The penal code can directly
address the worst problems associated with traditional, religiously motivated
polygyny, such as underage girls being coerced into marriages, sexually
assaulted, and physically abused.57 Those who commit such felonies should be
prosecuted for what they have done, like anyone else, regardless of the context.

53 However, some recent qualitative research shows that concerns about poly-parenting may be
exaggerated. See Goldfeder & Sheff, supra note 45.
54 See, e.g., Strassberg, supra note 14, at 560.
55 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (West 2004), invalidated in part by Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d
1170 (D. Utah 2013).
56 Samantha Slark, Study Note, Are Anti-Polygamy Laws an Unconstitutional Infringement on the
Liberty Interests of Consenting Adults?, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 451, 458 (2004).
57 Elizabeth F. Emens, Just Monogamy?, in JUST MARRIAGE, supra note 47, at 75, 76.
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Nationally, the overwhelming majority of abused and neglected children do
not grow up in polygamous households.58 Because many two-person intimate
relationships and marriages damage children, it is not evident that plural forms
are or would be worse under more ideal conditions.59 A plural marriage may
turn out to be more conducive to the raising of children with the advantages
that come with multiple caregivers and multiple incomes. Polygamous parents
could more easily institute a more efficient division of labor than couples and
single parents with respect to parenting responsibilities. It is no secret that
there are not enough hours in the day or days in the week for most couples to
cross off everything on their lists, especially when both of them work outside
the home to earn two incomes. Also, a plural marriage may turn out to be good
for children because one parent leaving the marriage or dying probably would
not be as disruptive.60
The possibility that, on average, thruples or moresomes constitute a
superior parenting framework cannot be ruled out. Most people have few
concerns with close friends or relatives sharing in the performance of parental
duties when necessary. This is one of the reasons why, compared with
single-person and even two-person households, extended families are capable
of providing better childcare; additional persons can work together to do
whatever needs to be done. In this country, it is common for couples that work
outside the home and can afford to hire help for childcare to do so. Moreover,
the effect of a bad or mediocre parent might be offset when a better parent
could do what either the bad parent does not want to do or cannot do
competently. Normally, the quality of parenting in a given household would
reflect whether the adults have the motivation, parenting skills, economic and
social resources, and time to devote to raising their children. The point is not
that moresomes always are terrific parents. All human beings have
shortcomings and some circumstances can be trying even for the best of
parents. A single mother or father may turn out to be better than a couple or
thruple. Rather, it is almost meaningless to discuss the likely quality of
parenting in the abstract. At most, without knowledge of all of the relevant
details, one can do no more than speculate. Until American lawmakers prohibit
the worst parents from having or raising children or implement a licensing
58

Expert Witness Report Prepared for the Amicus Curiae by Jonathan Turley at paras. 167, 170,
Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588 (Can.) (No. S-097767), available
at https://jonathanturley.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/turley-affidavit.pdf [hereinafter Expert Report].
59 Will Kymlicka, Rethinking the Family, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 77, 92 & n.17 (1991).
60 See PHILIP L. KILBRIDE & DOUGLAS R. PAGE, PLURAL MARRIAGE FOR OUR TIMES: A REINVENTED
OPTION? 10–11 (2d ed. 2012).
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scheme, the argument that plural marriages should not be allowed because they
do not serve the welfare of children cannot get off the ground.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
A. Liberal Neutrality
The first three Parts of this Article elaborate on the weakness of the state’s
two main interests—ensuring gender equality in marriages and promoting child
welfare—in not permitting plural marriage. In terms of standards of review,
they may not be important or compelling, which is what strict or intermediate
scrutiny would call for and they may fall short of being legitimate inasmuch as
they are rooted in animus.61 Just as the state must have an adequate
constitutional rationale not to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples, it
also must have such a rationale for not allowing a person who already is
married to marry someone else or for a person who is not already married to
marry someone who already is married. The kinds of reasons that opponents of
plural marriage muster on behalf of their view purport to have something to do
with a connection between numerical restrictions and preventing harms. Not
only are those reasons empirically far from certain, given the inherent
difficulty of causal inference, but they are morally controversial as well.
Under conditions of moral pluralism, the state is not supposed to favor
particular conceptions of the good at the expense of others as long as the
conceptions in question are reasonable by not harming third parties or putting
them at risk. Among political theorists and philosophers, the very idea of
neutrality is contentious, and those who endorse some version of it are likely to
dispute its meaning and application in borderline cases. The reality of sincere
and reasonable disagreement, though, has never caused them to waver in their
confidence in the soundness of their arguments of political morality. They
continue to write, more often than not, as if they could not possibly be wrong.
With the exception of perfectionists, many liberals adhere to one version of
such neutrality or another by being committed to the principle that the state

61 Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor make clear that such a justification is suspect in the context of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). For a recent and
interesting take on animus, see Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection for Animus, 2013 SUP.
CT. REV. 183.
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should not dictate to people what kind of life they ought to have.62 As far as the
state is concerned, the meaning of life is in the eye of the beholder. For
anti-perfectionist liberals, such neutrality excludes appeals to controversial
moral beliefs when the state enacts public laws. The state would violate such
neutrality, for instance, if it promoted only one kind of sexual behavior, love,
or intimacy on the ground that it was intrinsically superior. Whatever else may
be said against same-sex marriage, the disparate treatment of gays and lesbians
cannot be justified as a means of endorsing heterosexism—that is, validating
opposite-sex intimate relationships or being straight.
American constitutional law incorporates something similar to a neutrality
requirement in which the state may not compel or even encourage people to
live certain kinds of lives because one way of living is inherently better than
others.63 The religion clauses of the First Amendment reflect the principle that
the state should not use its power to endorse one religion over others. The
doctrine of substantive due process, which emphasizes personal choice and
liberty, is at odds with the idea that the state can try to dictate to people how
they should live their lives. For Bedi, “[T]here is some synergy between liberal
neutrality and the Equal Protection Clause.”64 One way to understand the
deeper purpose of equal protection doctrine is to see it as a restriction on the
extent to which the state may enact legislative classifications that favor some
groups over others, thereby making it more difficult for the disadvantaged
minority to have a better life. It may be unconstitutional, then, for the state to
confer the status of marriage on some intimate relationships but not on others.
As long as the state stays in the marriage business, neutrality implies that the
state must respect the right of all competent adults to choose the marital
arrangement that best suits their particular needs. Even if most people were
made healthier, wealthier, and happier by being married to only one person, the
state still may not promote a parochial conception of marriage or continue
mononormative or amatonormative practices. The constitutional principle of
neutrality means that the state should not advance controversial conceptions of
the good.65 Thus, the state may not deliberately advance such conceptions in

62 TAMARA METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT: MARRIAGE, THE STATE, AND THE CASE FOR THEIR DIVORCE
106–07 (2010).
63 For the view that such a neutrality requirement is to be found in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, see Wilfrid Waluchow, On the Neutrality of Charter Reasoning, in NEUTRALITY AND THEORY OF
LAW 203 (Jordi Ferrer Beltrán et al. eds., 2013).
64 BEDI, supra note 11, at 15.
65 STEVEN WALL, LIBERALISM, PERFECTIONISM AND RESTRAINT 41 (1998).
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the absence of an adequate justification that is independent of the “merits” of
the way of life in question.
This Article does not intend to offer another philosophical defense of such
neutrality but instead to see what follows constitutionally from such a
commitment with respect to marriage. Because the principle of neutrality limits
the extent to which the state may interfere with their personal decisions and
may treat people unequally, states may be constitutionally required to grant
marriage licenses to plural marriage enthusiasts when states already give such
licenses to opposite and same-sex couples that meet the other valid
requirements. That conclusion may seem radical at this particular moment in
American history, but its time may come someday. After all, many
contemporary, well-established constitutional understandings were once
widely believed to be lacking constitutional support. In particular, the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses have been be construed in ways that
their authors and ratifiers never would have anticipated. For example, it is
remarkable how rapidly what was once an unthinkable constitutional position
(namely that the state must accord legal status to same-sex couples) has
morphed into a view that no liberal would reject and many conservatives are
acquiescing to because the writing is on the wall. At the very least, even if this
Article only preaches to the converted, fails to move anybody off the fence,
and does not convince a single person who initially opposed plural marriage,
its aim is to establish that the constitutional position that it develops and
defends is more than tenable.
B. The Constitutional Principle of Autonomy
From the standpoint of substantive due process, the significance of being
able to select multiple marital partners cannot be overestimated. This section
explains why a competent adult should be able to marry however many people
she wants for just about whatever personal reasons she happens to have, unless
a marriage is so large and complex that it becomes administratively
unmanageable. That already is the situation for couples that satisfy the other
eligibility requirements, at least for opposite-sex ones in all states and for
same-sex ones in well over half of states. The basic strategy of this Article is to
call attention to the double standard under which the state does not examine the
quality of the reasons that most couples have for wanting to marry, yet at the
same time assume that the reasons that people have for wanting a plural
marriage cannot be satisfactory. Before getting to equal protection analysis,
this Article articulates how marital choice is as important as other kinds of
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personal choices that the Court shields from legislative encroachment, such as
whether to use birth control, to have a child, to have consensual sex with
another adult, or to end one’s life.66 As Nussbaum states, “Articulating and
protecting . . . spheres of personal liberty has been a crucial task of our
tradition of constitutional law.”67 No doubt, it would be harder to establish a
constitutional right to plural marriage if Americans did not live in the shadow
of marriage—that is, if, apart from the material and expressive benefits that
come with it, marriage were not laden with so many shared social meanings.
In 2015, most Americans care deeply about being allowed to make the most
personal of personal decisions, including whom to marry, and often are not
indifferent to their own marital status or that of others. As misguided as any
personal decision may turn out, under existing constitutional doctrine, there is
a strong presumption in favor of letting competent adults decide what they
want to do. The more personal the decision is, the higher the likelihood that the
state cannot interfere with it. It is hard to imagine too many personal decisions
that are more important, for most people, than the decision about how to
arrange their intimate lives.
As this section shows, the well-entrenched constitutional right of personal
choice, or autonomy, extends to the right to marry more than one person at the
same time, particularly when the importance of such choice in a society like
our own is so high and the importance of countervailing state interests is so
low. This Article interprets “privacy” to be synonymous with autonomy—that
is, one’s capacity to formulate a conception of the good life and act
accordingly with undue interference by the state. In equating privacy with the
broader concept of personal liberty, this Article is not breaking new ground.68
Its novelty comes from connecting the exercise of autonomy to marital choice,
including being able to select a multi-person marriage. One has to wonder how
controversial the right to privacy would be, whatever it is called, if it had not
served as the foundation of the Roe v. Wade decision,69 which many

66 I stick with fundamental-rights analysis and do not venture into the territory of fundamental rights
under equal protection because if a right is fundamental, strict scrutiny applies. On this point, see ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 691–92 (4th ed. 2011).
67 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, at xvi (2010).
68 See, e.g., DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF
ROE V. WADE 659, 916 n.25, 939 n.92 (1998).
69 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Americans reject.70 While the word “privacy” can be more trouble than it is
worth, it has not ceased to capture the place of autonomy (and agency) in our
constitutional tradition.
Just as importantly, the term reflects how critical it is to give all people as
much freedom as possible so that they can pursue even their idiosyncratic ends.
A society like ours that is committed to protecting such freedom as an end in
itself or as a means to human flourishing, then, cannot simply defer to
legislative judgments in such situations, as if it were self-evident that
lawmakers can be trusted to protect minority groups and foster individual
rights. Judicial review in America always will be predicated on the belief that
legislative majorities have a tendency to exceed their authority and be hostile
or unsympathetic to legitimate differences. A commitment to constitutionalism
does not have to take the form of American-style judicial review, but
Americans have grown accustomed to delegating to judges the power to
determine constitutional limits in real cases, and that state of affairs will not
disappear in the foreseeable future. As rare as it is these days, judicial restraint
or deference should not be praised when the alternative, namely judicial
abdication, is worse. There is no point in granting the power of judicial review
to judges if they are not inclined to use it to check lawmakers who act
unconstitutionally.
In the abstract, most Americans value personal choice in other contexts and
therefore are reluctant to let lawmakers make such decisions for them, unless
the state is unequivocally justified in denying such choice. In the midst of the
widely held belief that competent adults are supposed to have as much control
as possible over their lives, it is surprising that so many academics are so
dismissive of the case for a constitutional right to plural marriage. The vast
majority of them have given little thought to the matter. That they are not
doing so is no longer excusable as the debate over same-sex marriage comes to
an end. And, their defense of monogamy cannot simply invoke gender equality
or the purported foolishness of wanting to experiment with a plural marriage.
True, people often make cognitive errors in trying to achieve their goals.71 One
could concede this point, which is found in the literature in social psychology
and behavioral economics, and nonetheless maintain that as far as the law is
concerned, you are the expert about your own life or at least better informed
70 Ashley Southall, Abortion Opponents March in Washington on Anniversary of Roe v. Wade Decision,
NY TIMES LEDE NEWS BLOG (Jan. 22, 2014, 8:09 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/abortionopponents-march-in-washington-on-anniversary-of-roe-v-wade-decision/.
71 SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM 2 (2013).
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than others. Under the marital status quo, each person not only has a right to
marry one (unmarried) consenting adult, but the couple can more or less
structure their shared life however they please unless they physically harm
each other. How could it be otherwise when our society continues to make
considerable room for individual, religious, and cultural differences, and to
permit unconventional beliefs and the practices that follow from them? This
right to select a marital partner is predicated on the belief that most persons
differ in what they are looking for in an intimate partner and what they want
their intimate relationships to be like in terms of their aspirations, expectations,
interactions, respective workloads, finances, and collective decisionmaking.
Their feelings about what is most important to them may change over time,
especially when their circumstances do not remain constant.
The trouble with the family-values movement in this country and its
traditional views about marriage is that—in addition to demeaning the intimate
lives of gays and lesbians—those views are often based on the poorly defended
view that a certain kind of family structure is superior to others. Because it is
almost self-evident that the claim is not only false but pernicious,
notwithstanding its ongoing rhetorical force in some circles, the central
assumption of this Article is that one size does not fit all with respect to
marriage, and thus, the more options, the better. Having a wide range of
intimate relationships to choose from not only makes normative sense by
enhancing marital flexibility, but the act of according all of them legal status
informs the public that no particular kind of marriage or family is preferable.
When it comes to the problem of the state only endorsing opposite-sex
marriage, the solution, which an ever expanding number of Americans favor, is
to equalize the two types of marriage by making the legal definition of
marriage more inclusive.
It is increasingly harder to maintain that the average same-sex marriage is
demonstrably worse than its opposite-sex counterpart. In fact, to their credit,
when they are not making comparisons, many conservative Christian
denominations do not idealize marriage and devote resources to help
(opposite-sex) couples work through their marital problems.72 When
traditionalists do not place real opposite-sex monogamous marriages on a
pedestal, they do not necessarily think that the best same-sex marriage is better

72 See, e.g., Anthony J. Garascia, Counseling, FOR YOUR MARRIAGE, http://www.foryourmarriage.org/
support/ (last visited May 17, 2015) (Catholic marriage counseling); Marriage and Family Therapists,
METHODIST COUNSELING CENTER, http://www.methodistcounseling.org/staff (last visited May 17, 2015).
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than the worst opposite-sex one, but they come close to doing so. They seem to
be conceding that, regardless of their gender composition, some opposite-sex
marriages will be dysfunctional. Of course, they could, as they have done in
the past, continue to appeal to the definition of marriage that they take for
granted. This strategy cannot work as long as the issue to be resolved centers
on how marriage should be defined for legal purposes. They cannot simply
conclude that marriage is only between a man and a woman because marriage
is only between a man and a woman (which is circular reasoning). What is
underappreciated is the extent to which they give ground with respect to
whether a same-sex relationship without children could be functional and even
fulfilling, regardless of whether the state treats it as a marriage or a
marriage-like relationship. The risk of basing one’s position on empirical
claims is that when more data becomes available, one’s position may be
undermined. To keep open the question of the quality of same-sex marriages is
to reveal curiosity about what might turn out be true. If some same-sex
marriages exhibit at least some of the virtues that opposite-sex marriages are
supposed to exhibit—like caregiving, selflessness, sacrifice, and
commitment—then it is not a stretch to believe that but for what a religious
source allegedly says about them, they would be worthy of acceptance.
Likewise, polygamous relationships could be characterized by the same kinds
of admirable behaviors that Americans hope couples will display. There is no
reason in principle to deny that a plural marriage could be loving or caring.73 In
fact, such a marriage may be better in some respects, including how children
are raised.74
As noted, our constitutional practice incorporates a commitment to
something like autonomy, in the sense of giving competent adults the
maximum freedom to pursue the ends that they find most worthwhile,
whatever that happens to be, and be able to learn what works best for them. At
present, whether they realize it, Americans have little marital choice. If they
had more choice, they might think and act more unconventionally, which
should be encouraged in a society that is enamored with conformity more than
it is willing to admit. With a more inclusive conception of marriage in place,
Americans might not be overly optimistic about their marital expectations.
After all, each marriage will have ups and downs and varying dynamics as
73 Elizabeth Brake, Recognizing Care: The Case for Friendship and Polyamory, SYRACUSE L. & CIVIC
ENGAGEMENT
F.,
http://slace.syr.edu/slace-journal-vol-1/recognizing-care-the-case-for-friendship-andpolyamory/ (last visited May 17, 2015).
74 See ELISABETH SHEFF, THE POLYAMORISTS NEXT DOOR: INSIDE MULTI-PARTNER RELATIONSHIPS AND
FAMILIES (2014).
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long as people have different personalities and as long as circumstances do not
remain static. In the name of marital diversity, then, it is more than conceivable
the state may be committing a serious wrong by reinforcing marital norms that
make it harder for individuals to think and act unconventionally in their
intimate relationships. Independent of not respecting their autonomy, the
specific outcomes, namely personal happiness or satisfaction, may be optimal
when they have a longer menu to select from, including nonsexual marriages
between or among close friends.
In any society that venerates monogamy, it may be hard to comprehend
why anyone would prefer marital multiplicity. One scholar doubts that much
emotional intimacy could exist among multiple persons.75 Many episodes of
HBO’s Big Love depict the challenges of a four-person polygynous
“marriage.” However, the same concern is just as applicable to many of the
important personal decisions that most people make during their lifetimes,
including those involving intimate relationships. Maybe those who put plural
marriage under a microscope should worry more about how much intimacy
actually exists in much more widespread monogamous marriages. Usually,
critics compare the worst kinds of polygynous relationships with ideal
monogamous ones, as if the latter could not be dysfunctional. Some people
will complement each other perfectly, whereas others will bring out the worst
in each other in intimate relationships. Even when they are not violent or
otherwise abusive, many married couples interact in unhealthy ways, in some
instances for most of their lifetimes. Nor do a lot of them display the
willingness or ability to work through their own problems to achieve the
intimacy that both of them probably desire. As one commentator observes,
The law determines who is eligible for marriage . . . but it says almost
nothing about what marriage itself consists in; it is a contract without
content. The law prescribes no behaviors, not even sexual
consummation, that must be exhibited in order to marry or stay
married. It dictates no requirements for the living arrangements of
married people.76

It is revealing that some critics of plural marriage, who seem so concerned
about the likely lack of emotional intimacy in plural relationships, have little or
no interest in policing the emotional intimacy of monogamous couples. To
respect personal choice in this context, to repeat, is not to approve of the
75 Samuel C. Rickless, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage: A Response to Calhoun, 42 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1043, 1047–48 (2005).
76 Brook J. Sadler, Re-Thinking Civil Unions and Same-Sex Marriage, 91 MONIST 578, 579–80 (2008).
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choices that people happen to make about whom to marry and how they will
conduct themselves. In states that now permit both types of couples to marry,
the meaning of marriage is left to the man and man, woman and woman, or
man and woman. Unless one is wedded to the view that there is something
unnatural about allowing two adults of the same sex to marry each other or that
a religious source condemns it, the double standard that this Article concerns
itself with is increasingly hard to defend in the wake of the increased marital
freedom for same-sex couples that now exists in this country. The
constitutional right to autonomy—what one can believe, say, or do—never
hinged on the wisdom of the personal choice in question. To respect the
exercise of such autonomy is to empower competent adults to make personal
choices, some of which will turn out to be mistaken. But, the implication of the
possibility or even likelihood of regrets is not enough for the state to take away
such personal choice and save competent adults from the consequences of their
poor judgment. For instance, as evidenced by the high divorce rate, for many
persons, particularly younger ones, the decision to marry is erroneous.77 It
probably would not be a bad idea to set the minimum age for a marriage
license at thirty where more people are financially stable and mature enough to
undertake the responsibilities that marriage demands. Along similar lines, the
state could regulate childbearing and childrearing more strictly if the primary
concern involves outcomes and not the value of making the personal choice.
That said, such proposals are constitutionally unthinkable, even if they
were motivated by the best of intentions. The Constitution does not require the
decision to have a child or marry (one person) to be minimally informed. With
respect to monogamous marriage, neither person is asked to put serious
thought into the decision even though one or both of them may subsequently
have second thoughts. At most, the state could entice them to do so by
providing financial incentives to receive premarital counseling. A profoundly
personal choice, like whom to marry, is assumed to be at minimum
semiautonomous, and those who marry reap the benefits or suffer the
consequences. Competent adults are treated as if their marital decision is
sufficiently well-informed, and this legal treatment does not account for the
risk factors. Even if social scientists could accurately identify the risks, the
Constitution still would allow competent adults to exercise their own
judgment. Contemporary marriage law is virtually silent about how couples

77 Marriage & Divorce, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/topics/divorce/ (last visited May 17,
2015) (“[A]bout 40 to 50 percent of married couples in the United States divorce.”).
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must interact with each other.78 They do not have to live together, pool their
finances, cooperate, treat each other nicely, be mutually emotionally
supportive, or love each other; they only must refrain from harming each other.
Within such a minimally regulated monogamous marriage, “individuals are
free to create a variety of meanings of marriage for themselves.”79 If personal
choice more generally were not so important, then the state might be able to
force women to have abortions or compel fathers to marry the mothers of their
children.
The final push for same-sex marriage equality seems to reaffirm why most
Americans value the institution and want the state to remain involved with it
despite a decrease in the marriage rate. The existence of a menu of marital
options would make marriage more voluntary, move people to be more
reflective, and strengthen the institution on the assumption that fewer
uninformed people would marry. After all, marriage should be treated as a
morally serious decision given its potential to harm the participants and third
parties. It is hard to imagine that Americans ever will be anti-marriage in the
sense they would not marry under any circumstances. If you do not think that
marital choice is important, use your imagination to envision a society in
which the state arranges all marriages not for eugenic purposes, a la Plato, but
to generate better outcomes, such as fewer divorces or more low-conflict
marriages. Ultimately, almost everyone would prefer to make such marital
choices for themselves, even if they knew that they would not choose wisely,
because the value of such a choice never can be reduced to its likely
consequences.
C. The Implications of Lawrence
A constitutional right to plural marriage is shorthand for giving people as
much discretion as possible to customize their marital arrangements. The more
important the choice is in terms of her life plan, the more the state should be
inclined to defer to that individual’s judgment in a constitutional democracy
that does not leave all of its political decisions to legislative majorities.
Although Lawrence v. Texas is not an inkblot test, the case provides support
for the view that lawmakers cannot prevent people from forming, revising, and
pursuing their respective conceptions of the good without adequate

78 I borrow the term “internal marriage,” which covers the personal interactions of the couple, from
MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE 5 (1999).
79 FINEMAN, supra note 47, at 97.
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justification.80 Like Laurence Tribe, one can construe the holding as creating a
broad constitutional right of autonomy.81 Lawrence should play a central role
in the coming debate over plural marriage because it helps to establish the
constitutional right of marital choice. Justice Kennedy begins his majority
opinion in Lawrence by writing that “[f]reedom extends beyond spatial
bounds” and speaking of the “transcendent dimensions” of liberty.82 Law is
interpretive, and the kind language found in the majority opinion invites
interpreters to expand the constitutional right to autonomy to cover situations
that involve the most personal of personal decisions.83 The freedom to select
intimate partners would be less imperative if doing so had nothing to do with
the quality of one’s life. Shortly thereafter, Kennedy writes, this “case involves
liberty of the person in both its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.”84
To see Lawrence as a case merely about same-sex sexual activity (or sexual
activity more generally) is to miss the forest for the trees.
Similarly, Bowers v. Hardwick was wrongly decided not only because it
makes it too easy for states to prohibit certain kinds of consensual sex acts,
which should not be illegal in the first place and stigmatize certain sexual
minorities (particularly gay men), but, just as importantly, because
anti-sodomy laws interfere with the intimacy that any couple may try to
develop and express as they come to know each other more than superficially.
The anti-sodomy law in Georgia applied to all couples, including the most
committed ones, and was not simply about the right to perform certain kinds of
sex acts in the privacy of one’s home for bodily pleasure.85 To reduce all
sexual activity to such pleasure or procreation is to be obtuse. That is not to say
that all couples always want to be physically intimate with each other, but it is
to say that most of them do and that to make anal and oral sex illegal is to
deprive any committed couple of what might be an essential part of the kind of
intimacy they want to have. That such an act cannot result in reproduction is
beside the constitutional point. When it interferes in this manner, with such a
flimsy justification that relies on a narrow interpretation of tradition, the state
exceeds its authority. As long as what the couple is doing is consensual and

80

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571, 577–78 (2003).
See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its Name,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1896–1900 (2004).
82 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
83 See id. at 578.
84 Id. at 562.
85 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.1 (1985).
81
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they are not breaking other valid laws, the couple should be able to relate to
each other however they please.
When someone finds it constitutionally acceptable to allow lawmakers to
ban only same-sex sex, as the three dissenters did in Lawrence, the red flag is
even redder.86 Just like straight persons, gays and lesbians have a fundamental
right to form, revise, and pursue their life plans. One could acknowledge this
point yet not go so far as to believe that marriage is as constitutionally
important as the personal freedom to be intimate with others and express that
intimacy as he or she sees fit. Marriage is not a means to an end or an end in
itself for some people, and it is not unreasonable, even in 2015, to eschew
marriage inasmuch as one believes that it is a patriarchal or heterosexist
institution that is beyond redemption. The point is that, given its material and
symbolic benefits in a society like ours, most Americans will not be indifferent
to their marital status. In his dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia fails to
distinguish a law that criminalizes consensual same-sex sex acts from
same-sex marriage.87 After all, it is not illogical to take the view that even
when the state cannot proscribe same-sex sex, it still does not have to
recognize same-sex unions. However, even a cursory look at Lawrence reveals
that the Court did not come close to equating the right to engage in same-sex
sexual intercourse with same-sex marriage or even civil unions. As Kennedy
writes, this case “does not involve whether government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”88
In fairness to Scalia, one can speculate about the implications of the
majority opinion, which does not speak for itself and may come to have a
broader meaning in the future. Precedents do not apply themselves, can be
ignored, and legal reasoning is not like an LSAT logic game. Scalia alleges
Kennedy’s conception of autonomy foreshadows judicial recognition of
same-sex marriage.89 Ultimately, Scalia may be more right than he is wrong in
connecting what the Court said in Lawrence to the future meaning of marriage.
American constitutional history amply demonstrates that no one can know with
anything like certainty that the current interpretation of the holding of a

86 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[M]en can violate the law only with other men, and
women only with other women. But this cannot itself be a denial of equal protection, since it is precisely the
same distinction regarding partner that is drawn in state laws prohibiting marriage with someone of the same
sex while permitting marriage with someone of the opposite sex.”).
87 Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 578 (majority opinion).
89 Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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particular case at one moment forecloses its application to subsequent fact
patterns in unanticipated ways. There may be adequate reasons to justify a ban
on plural marriages that do not exist with respect to criminalizing same-sex sex
acts. Lawrence easily could stand for a strong presumption in favor of freedom
of choice in the most important aspects of people’s private lives.90 Or, it may
mean that mere moral disapproval, as a rationale for regulating people’s
private lives, is suspect.91 Regardless, nobody thinks that Lawrence provided
constitutional support for a state’s continuing resistance to same-sex
marriage.92
In a post-Lawrence world, then, it is not as easy as it used to be for the state
to interfere with people’s private lives by limiting their choice of marriage
partners. Mere moral disapproval of same-sex consensual sex no longer
justifies criminalization. As noted, the idea that people exercise their autonomy
or freedom of choice poorly, with respect to either their means or ends, is
constitutionally neither here nor there. Someone may make sad, or even tragic,
personal choices, but that possibility does not adequately justify state
interference with the most important features of that person’s private life
unless compelling reasons for such interference exist. And a “compelling”
reason does not mean any reason that the state happens to come up with.93 The
rationale for intervention cannot be the poor quality of the decisionmaking
process or the likely undesirable outcome of the choice for the agent. Under
the status quo, many individuals make awful choices regarding whether to
marry. They may marry the worst possible partner for them or marry for the
wrong reasons. When they later have buyer’s remorse, the state does not
interfere; it is up to them to decide how they want to proceed. An unhappy
marriage with some good days may be better than being alone. The mere
possibility of future regrets never warrants the elimination of marital choice.
The state could not subject those who want to marry to background checks or
psychological evaluations, as if they were purchasing a handgun, to identify
marriages that are more prone to be dysfunctional or are at greater risk of
failing. There is not a legal limit on how many times people can marry or
divorce or how many children they may have despite criminal records,
diagnosed personality disorders or other mental health issues, substance abuse
90

Id. at 578 (majority opinion).
Levinson, supra note 2, at 1052.
92 See DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 283 (2012).
93 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 687 (noting that, in order for the government interest to be
compelling, “[t]he government must have a truly significant reason for discriminating, and it must show that it
cannot achieve its objective through any less discriminatory alternative”).
91
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problems or other addictions, anger management difficulties, a history of
violence, insolvency, or delinquent child or spousal support obligations. They
are free to make the same bad choices over and over again.
A high divorce rate indicates that many couples eventually realize that they
cannot continue to live together and would prefer to be single or look for
another partner. Even if they do not divorce, a married couple may stay
together for the wrong reasons and be anything but happy. Being together for
fifty years does not necessarily reflect marital bliss. It may reveal risk aversion
or codependency. Like it or not, with respect to monogamous marriage, as far
as the state is concerned, adults are left to reap the benefits or to suffer the
consequences. For the most part, the state pays no attention to its quality. Why,
then, is marital choice so limited when it comes to marrying more than one
person at the same time or marrying someone who is already married to
someone else? The decision to enter into such a marital relationship may turn
out to be wonderful, terrible, or somewhere in between the two extremes. The
outcome cannot be predicted without a crystal ball.
D. The Right to Marriage
Although the constitutional right to marriage does not appear in the text of
the Constitution, most scholars do not see that fact as much of an obstacle.
After all, many important constitutional rights (and powers) are unenumerated,
and only the most fanatical of textualists would take the opposite view. Several
well-known Supreme Court decisions take for granted the existence of such a
right to marriage,94 and disagreement arises with respect to its proper scope in
particular cases.95 Unlike many other fundamental rights, marriage is a positive
right that requires the state to accord a legal status.96 Therefore, states can
decide almost all of its eligibility requirements and determine which financial
benefits and legal privileges come with it.97 As noted, critics of plural marriage
have not satisfactorily explained why states may define marriage in a manner
94 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhall, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“[T]he right to marry is of fundamental
importance for all individuals.”); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (“This
Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”).
95 In discussing the constitutional right to marry, Cass Sunstein draws a useful distinction between its
content and its scope. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 2082.
96 Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27, 32 (1996).
97 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
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that excludes marital relationships that contain more than two adults. When
their constitutional opposition rests on legal moralism, tradition, paternalism,
and the empirically dubious secondary effects of traditional polygyny, they run
the risk of violating both the letter and the spirit of Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and Lawrence.98 At present, the idea that a
particular kind of behavior allegedly corrupts public morals or causes others
distress but does not directly harm them is unlikely to rise to the level of an
important or compelling interest, which a heightened standard of review would
require. Even if there were a better philosophical rationale for denying people
the opportunity to marry more than one person at the same time, it still is hard
to visualize how such a rationale could be squared with existing constitutional
doctrine and cases that unequivocally put the burden of proof on the state to
show why the personal choice in question should not be allowed. The more
important the choice, the more compelling the state’s rationale must be to deny
that choice.
If questioned, few scholars, judges, and lawyers would doubt the existence
of the fundamental right to marry, even though it does not appear in the
constitutional text or comport with original public meaning, understood as the
framers’ intent or original expected applications. However, that does not mean
that they agree on which restrictions are allowed.99 Those who are against the
extension of the fundamental right to marriage must necessarily be of the
mindset that most plural marriages are much worse than their monogamous
counterparts. The response to this objection is simple: if traditional
monogamous marriages were inherently unequal, frequently involved less than
fully autonomous choices, or were deeply dysfunctional, states still would not
prohibit them to save the couple from their own bad judgment. To do so would
unarguably violate their right to marital choice.100
At minimum, the state’s refusal to expand the coverage of the constitutional
right of marriage to plural marriage enthusiasts has to be defended more
vigorously than it has been in the past. In Loving v. Virginia, Chief Justice
Warren articulated the importance of a person’s being able to choose his or her
98

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833

(1992).
99

See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (declaring laws that prevent prisoners from marrying
are unconstitutional); Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374 (declaring laws that prohibit those who are delinquent on their
child support payments from remarrying are unconstitutional); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)
(declaring laws that require unreasonably high filing fees and court costs to divorce are unconstitutional);
Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (declaring laws that ban interracial marriages are unconstitutional).
100 See Calhoun, supra note 29, at 1040–41.
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spouse.101 In the context of the debate over same-sex marriage, though, each
side tends to interpret the holding narrowly or broadly in the service of their
desired constitutional conclusion. Loving could represent the constitutional
principle that the state cannot act on the basis of racist reasons to limit
marriage to same-race couples.102 However, its holding could be construed to
incorporate a broader constitutional principle of marital nondiscrimination and
include all classifications in which judges do not simply defer to the state’s
eligibility requirements. In other words, the state must have adequate reasons
for treating some persons differently than others when it refuses to give only
some persons the right to marry the person that they want to marry. In 2015,
few people think that bans on interracial marriage are unproblematic simply
because a person could always marry another person from his or her own racial
group.
V. EQUAL PROTECTION
A. Background
The relationship between the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses is
complicated and beyond the scope of this Article. However, to render
American constitutional doctrine, case law, and practice as coherent as
possible, it makes sense to conceptualize one of its main normative purposes as
respecting the freedom and equality of all of American citizens. In legal
literature, this is known as a public justification requirement.103 If the
Constitution incorporates such a requirement, or something like it, then laws
that do not permit competent adults to marry multiple partners are at minimum
constitutionally questionable. In equal protection cases, judges do not ask why
the state may try to prevent everyone from behaving in certain ways.
Alternatively, they decide whether the state may treat one group of people
more or less favorably and, therefore, deny them a benefit when others already
enjoy it. A law that only allows persons over a certain age to consume alcohol,
101

Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
The Virginia Supreme Court had found that the state’s purposes of preserving “the racial integrity of
its citizens” and preventing “the corruption of blood” were legitimate. As Warren pointed out, these reasons
are an “endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy.” Id. at 7.
103 In POLITICAL LIBERALISM, Rawls referred to the U.S. Supreme Court as “exemplar of public reason.”
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 231 (expanded ed. 2005); see also John Rawls, The Ideal of Public
Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 768, 786 (1997). Lawrence Solum was the first legal scholar to begin
to develop the place of public reason in law and legal reasoning. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Pluralism and
Public Legal Reason, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 7 (2006).
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for instance, would be constitutional if judges accept the state’s reasons under
the appropriate standard of review. The higher the applicable standard of
review, the better those reasons must be for the challenged law to pass muster.
In equal protection cases, then, a state may treat certain groups differently
as long as it can successfully defend such treatment. The fundamental question
in such cases concerns whether the legislative classification in question is
“justified by a sufficient purpose.”104 For a heightened standard of review, such
as strict or intermediate scrutiny, judges assess the reasons that the state
advances on behalf of the legislative classification at issue with a presumption
that they are unsatisfactory.105 When it comes to marriage, those state interests
cannot be the promotion of white supremacy.106 It has become increasingly
evident that states are not on firm constitutional ground inasmuch as refusal to
allow same-sex couples to marry is based on animus against gays and lesbians
or heteronormativity. More generally, if lawmakers invidiously discriminate
against sexual minorities, then judges may apply something more like a
heightened standard of review by not deferring to what lawmakers have
decided to do. Laws that do not treat same-sex couples equally imply their
inferiority.107 While Lawrence is not technically an equal protection case, it is
pertinent to the question of when, if ever, states may treat sexual minorities
differently.108 In that case, by not repealing such a law, Texas was
substantiating their status as second-class citizens.
As this Part will try to show, equal protection analysis leads to the
conclusion that laws that fail to allow plural marriage enthusiasts to have the
kind of intimate relationship that they want violate the Constitution.
Restrictions based on sexual orientation are no longer nearly as easy to defend
as they once were, and many judges doubt that state interests suffice to
override unequal legal treatment with respect to marriage licenses. In Romer v.
Evans, the Court found that animus against gays and lesbians fails to rise to the
level of a legitimate state interest.109 Perry v. Schwarzenegger and Perry v.
Brown call into question the quality of the state’s reasoning for not allowing
gays and lesbians to marry.110 The Court decided Hollingsworth on procedural
104

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 685.
Id. at 687.
106 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 7.
107 See John Corvino, Homosexuality and the PIB Argument, 115 ETHICS 501, 509 (2005).
108 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
109 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
110 See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.
Ct. 2652 (2013); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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grounds, but in doing so it reaffirmed the lower federal courts’ decisions to
invalidate Proposition 8.111 The dignity language of Windsor raises the
question of whether any state that refuses to let a man marry another man or a
woman marry another woman is acting constitutionally.112 This decision could
stand for the view that legally there is no meaningful difference between those
who are straight and those who are not.113 Many lower federal courts are
reading Windsor in a manner that underscores its dignity language and
connects it to the right to marriage.114
The inappropriateness of using sexual orientation as the basis of a
legislative classification also may undermine confidence in the belief that
numerical restrictions are constitutionally allowable. This is how the courts
may connect the dots. When a judge invalidates a particular legislative
classification on equal protection grounds, he or she thinks not only that one
group is being discriminated against but also that the state lacks a sufficient
interest in such discriminatory treatment. By their very nature, legislative
classifications treat different people differently. If the Equal Protection Clause
requires identical treatment in all situations, then the state never could make
any legal classifications, no matter how warranted. Alternatively, judges also
have come around to the view the reasons the state has offered on behalf of the
law do not justify the unequal treatment in question.115 The application of a
heightened standard of review, more generally, in some equal protection cases
reflects the worry that the state probably is acting on the basis of the wrong
reasons.116 Even if only rational basis is triggered, the legislative classification
cannot be rooted in animus against a politically unpopular group.117 The state
may not make distinctions under the Equal Protection Clause without sufficient
justification. The more that states’ reasons for imposing numerical restrictions
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Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2710 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 2696 (majority opinion).
114 William Peacock, One Year After Windsor: The State of Same-Sex Marriage, FINDLAW (June 26,
2014, 2:48 PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/strategist/2014/06/one-year-after-windsor-the-state-of-same-sexmarriage.html.
115 One of the most recent, impressive, and innovative approaches to understanding equal protection
jurisprudence in terms of public reasons is found in the work by BEDI, supra note 11.
116 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1564–65 (noting that the Supreme Court’s application of intermediate
scrutiny to gender discrimination reflected the Court’s low tolerance for “legislative classifications than
presume that women have no responsibilities outside the home”).
117 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 472, 446–47 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 (1982); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
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resemble those for not permitting persons of the same gender to marry each
other, the more constitutionally suspect such laws are.
B. The Analogy
Although the interdisciplinary literature on same-sex marriage and the
family generally is voluminous, little has been written about plural marriage
and other unconventional forms of marriage, like asexual or incestuous
(between or among consenting adults).118 This oversight reflects the fact that
the same-sex marriage battle is not over and that opponents of same-sex
marriage use slippery slope arguments indiscriminately to discredit such
marriage.119 The result is that plural marriage is not discussed with the kind of
care that it warrants. The same-sex marriage debate suggests that more
Americans are becoming accustomed to the idea that intimacy does not have to
be opposite sex. Even those who continue to reject the legal recognition of a
marriage between a man and another man or a woman and another woman
probably concede that two men or women could love each other even when
they cannot reproduce without the aid of technology. If love can be same sex,
then it is not unreasonable to believe that there can also be “big love,” so to
speak. For progressives, the reasons that conservatives deploy to support their
opposition to same-sex marriage fall short. At the same time, many
progressives overlook or downplay the extent to which the main reasons for
supporting same-sex marriage (such as personal choice and equal legal
treatment) can be used to defend the legal recognition of plural marriage.
The slope from one kind of marriage to the other may be slippery.120 An
individual who denies their constitutional similarity will not only have to
establish that the two kinds of marriage are not the same in relevant ways but
also that the state may treat them differently without acting unconstitutionally.
As this Article emphasizes, a plural marriage could take a variety of forms; it

118 For a brief discussion of incestuous marriage, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 149–51 (1996). For a nuanced
defense of its adult form, see Andrew F. March, What Lies Beyond Same-Sex Marriage? Marriage,
Reproductive Freedom and Future Persons in Liberal Public Justification, 27 J. APPLIED PHIL. 39, 42–45
(2010).
119 E.g., Stanley Kurtz, The Libertarian Question: Incest, Homosexuality, and Adultery, in SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 263, 263, 268 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds.,
2d ed. 2004) (arguing that same-sex marriage would “set in motion a series of threats to the ethos of
monogamy” and remove the societal “taboos” associated with incest and adultery).
120 See Kent Greenfield, The Slippery Slope to Polygamy and Incest, AM. PROSPECT (July 15, 2013),
http://prospect.org/article/slippery-slope-polygamy-and-incest.
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could be same sex, bisexual, or asexual and is not synonymous with the most
troubling features of patriarchal polygynous relationships. Critics like to pull a
bait and switch. When discussing legal recognition of plural marriage, critics
cite polygynous marriages in undeveloped nations with dramatically different
background conditions as if only two options exist—prohibition or an
“anything goes” alternative with no administrative oversight whatsoever. That
is a false choice when the state could regulate such marriages to minimize
exploitation and other harms.
The same-sex marriage debate is instructive because it is not just about
whether states are acting unconstitutionally when they deny same-sex couples
marriage licenses. It is also about the meaning of the “m” word under
conditions of moral pluralism, how the state should be involved in the
institution, how Americans should interpret marital equality, and when, if ever,
the marital choice of competent adults ought to be limited. Oddly enough,
recent arguments in defense of same-sex marriage have a noticeably
conservative dimension: those who defend it, in the name of marital equality,
are determined to show that legal recognition will reinforce the traditional
understanding of marriage in which two, and no more than two, persons are
committed to each other in a long-term, sexually exclusive relationship. The
gender of each person in the dyad is neither here nor there. That strategy, while
shrewd, has the unintended consequence of perpetuating “amatonormativity,”
the unjustified favoring of sexual dyads at the expense of other equally
worthwhile intimate relationships.121
C. Similarities and Differences
Amatonormativity resembles heteronormativity in several respects. For
example, both of them can emerge from a fear or intolerance of difference. Just
as gays and lesbians have been the “other” in a society like our own in which
straight persons constitute a majority and being straight is considered normal,
these days polygamists often serve as a stand-in for sexual deviance, even
when they are heterosexual. In terms of the granting of marriage licenses, race
is and sexual orientation (gender) should be legally irrelevant. At the time of
this Article’s publication, only thirteen states continue to exclude same-sex
couples from the institution.122 Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a
121
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Elizabeth Brake coined this term in MINIMIZING MARRIAGE: MARRIAGE, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 5

122 Marriage Center, supra note 3 (including Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas).
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petition for a writ of certiorari in several cases involving such states.123 The
issue of same-sex marriage implicates multi-person intimate relationships
inasmuch as the legal definition of marriage may fail to be sufficiently
inclusive. Some scholars believe that the debates over same-sex and plural
marriage are not analogous.124 After all, one could believe they are different in
at least two relevant ways. First, linking them may be a misguided political
strategy.125 Second, the reasons that do not warrant treating same-sex couples
differently than their opposite-sex counterparts nevertheless may justify
treating multi-person intimate relationships differently. Unfortunately, too
many progressives are too eager to differentiate same-sex from plural marriage
so that they can establish a constitutional right to the former without proving
too much and thereby also making room for a right to the latter. During the
hearings that preceded the passage of the DOMA, some of those who testified
equated polygamy with same-sex marriage.126
D. The Slippery Slope
It is far from obvious, then, that same-sex and plural marriage are morally
or legally equivalent. A restriction based on sexual orientation may not be
sufficiently similar to a numerical restriction. A fair number of defenders of
same-sex marriage “go to great lengths” to deny the equivalence between
same-sex and plural marriage.127 Some of them insist that the legal recognition
of same-sex marriage will not necessarily precipitate the advent of the legal
recognition of plural marriage.128 For them, anyone who seeks to marry more
than one person at the same time can at least marry one person that he or she
loves. Their motivation for this response is not hard to grasp when one
considers that traditionalists never tire of making the slope between the two
types of marriage as slippery as possible.129 In his dissent in Lawrence, Justice
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Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039, 1040 (2015) (mem.).
See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Glazer, Sodomy and Polygamy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 66, 71 (2011).
125 Jaime M. Gher, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage—Allies or Adversaries Within the Same-Sex
Marriage Movement, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 559, 602 (2008).
126 Chambers, supra note 32, at 53.
127 Andrew F. March, Is There a Right to Polygamy? Marriage, Equality and Subsidizing Families in
Liberal Public Justification, 8 J. MORAL PHIL. 246, 247 (2011).
128 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 148–49; EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE
CONSTITUTION 104 (2d ed. 2008); JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD
FOR STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR AMERICA 123–37 (2004); Jonathan Rauch, Marrying Somebody, in SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 285, 286 (Andrew Sullivan ed., rev. ed. 2004); Andrew Sullivan, Three’s a Crowd,
in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON, supra, at 278, 279.
129 See, e.g., Kurtz, supra note 119, at 263, 266.
124

DEN OTTER GALLEYSPROOFS2

2020

5/27/2015 2:13 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1977

Scalia stated that the decriminalization of laws against same-sex sex set a
dangerous precedent.130 A few of these slippery-slope fears are absurd: Just
because a man can marry another man, or a woman can marry another woman,
does not mean that a person can marry a toaster. No empirical evidence comes
close to proving that the legal recognition of same-sex marriage must
culminate in the legal recognition of all conceivable kinds of marriage.131
Children cannot legally consent to a marriage contract, and neither can animals
or inanimate objects. The vast majority of slippery-slope arguments incorrectly
assume that no one in the future could draw a principled distinction between
these two scenarios from those involving consenting adults.
That said, several slippery-slope arguments are not as ridiculous as most of
them. In redefining marriage to include same-sex couples, lawmakers and
judges are setting a precedent of willingness to entertain a new definition of
marriage that is more inclusive, which an increasing number of Americans are
coming to believe is more just. The main reasons that support compelling
states to accord legal status to same-sex marriages (such as personal choice and
equal legal treatment) reach plural marriages as well.132 A conscientious person
concerns herself with combating all kinds of unjustified legal discrimination,
even when she has not directly suffered from the discrimination in question.
Normally, to fully comprehend the harm of being marginalized is to empathize
with the victims. According to Pro-Polygamy.com, plural marriage is “the next
civil rights battle.”133 Even if that statement is over the top, a good point can
stand to be overstated. It is not ridiculous to believe that discrimination against
plural marriage enthusiasts may be caused more by prejudice than anything
else and that such discrimination, which is unnecessary, diminishes their lives.
Part of the effort on the part of polyamorists to convince the public to become
less hostile to their cause has been to highlight the similarities between plural
marriage and same-sex marriage.134 Those who take this approach hope that
eventually more Americans will begin to acquiesce to the phenomenon of
same-sex marriages and then question the rationale for numerical restrictions.
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Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Judith Stacey & Tey Meadow, New Slants on the Slippery Slope: The Politics of Polygamy and
Gay Family Rights in South Africa and the United States, 37 POL. & SOC’Y 167, 190–92 (2009).
132 BRAKE, supra note 121, at 198; March, supra note 127.
133 PRO-POLYGAMY.COM, http://www.Pro-Polygamy.com (last visited May 17, 2015).
134 Jeffrey Michael Hayes, Comment, Polygamy Comes Out of the Closet: The New Strategy of Polygamy
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Slippery-slope arguments stem from the belief that no logical stopping
point exists in a particular context. Their force tends to come less from their
soundness and more from the probability that people will fail to distinguish
between the two things in question. In the case of plural marriage, a right to
such marriage may follow from a right to same-sex marriage if same-sex
marriage serves as a precedent for redefining marriage. Just imagine that in a
Supreme Court’s majority opinion concluding that states must allow same-sex
couples to marry, the Court includes broad language that provides some
support for the view that the state must cease to discriminate against plural
marriage enthusiasts. In contemporary America, the distance between the legal
recognition of opposite-sex and same-sex monogamous marriage is not nearly
as wide as it used to be. While the same cannot be said about the distance
between monogamous and plural marriage, times may change, and the public
may come to see the two kinds of marriage as not so different. Over time, more
Americans may care less about the structure of a marriage and more about its
interpersonal dynamics. Few of them see a four-person family and a ten-person
family as being so dramatically different due to their numbers that they warrant
different legal treatment. If the public’s attitude changes, then the
constitutional principle of nondiscrimination could lead to the constitutional
conclusion that marriage cannot be limited to couples. In 1967, no one
anticipated that one day Loving would be enlisted to support the cause of
marriage equality for gays and lesbians. The creative use of an old case in new
circumstances never can be ruled out because of the uncertainty of the future.
For constitutional purposes, a principled distinction between same-sex and
plural marriage may be hard to maintain. The right to marry someone at all is
not exactly the same, in every respect, as the right to marry multiple persons.
Some commentators insist that “[t]he gay situation is unique.”135 That is true,
as this Article concedes, but the implication is not that the situation of plural
marriage enthusiasts, whether gay, straight, bisexual, or transgender, is fine.
Requesting the right to marry more than one person simultaneously is no more
trivial than wanting to have more than one close friend or child, unless one is
in the thrall of the view that a person could not possibly love or care for more
than one person at the same time. That view is demonstrably false. Whether
her desire for a nonmonogamous marital arrangement is frivolous is a function
of the quality of the personal reasons for wanting such an arrangement. The
quality of these reasons is subjective in the sense that whether they are good or
bad reflects on his or her priorities. A considerable number of people want to
135
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be able to structure their personal lives in a manner that maximizes their
chances of achieving their ends, whatever those ends happen to be. Americans
do not have to decide which kind of discrimination is worse. The rights of all
polygamists should not be cast away as if they do not matter. From a
constitutional perspective, the lives of all persons—including all sexual
minorities—count equally.
E. Standards of Review
The Equal Protection Clause mandates that legislative classifications must
be sufficiently publicly justified.136 When a heightened standard of review is
applicable, the court is probably going to find the law being evaluated to be
unconstitutional. In Gerald Gunther’s famous words, strict scrutiny is “‘strict’
in theory and fatal in fact.”137 According to Sonu Bedi, “[W]hether a group
counts as a suspect class makes all of the constitutional difference in the
world.”138 Doctrinally, only suspect classes receive extra judicial protection,
which is to say that almost all legislative classifications only trigger rational
basis standard of review and, thus, are likely to be found to be constitutional.139
The rationale for such extra protection comes from the imperative of protecting
“discrete and insular minorities.”140 In deciding whether a particular group
constitutes a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the three criteria are: an immutable
or fixed characteristic, political powerlessness, and history of discrimination.141
A growing number of judges believe that gays and lesbians meet these
criteria.142
As the first part of this Article attempted to establish, the strength of the
main state interests against plural marriage—ensuring gender equality and
136

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 685.
Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
138 BEDI, supra note 11, at 2.
139 However, empirically, when real judges apply standards of review to real cases, the result may be
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142 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
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promoting the welfare of children—are weak. The promotion of internal
equality is not important or compelling in the constitutional sense of the terms.
If it were, then one would expect that the state would scrutinize two-person
marriages much more closely. In terms of such equality, the best polyamorous
marriage would be much better than the worst opposite-sex, monogamous one.
If the state is to defend the double standard with a greater chance of success, it
must be able to demonstrate that plural marriages—and not just some
polygynous ones—are inherently dysfunctional and that, as a consequence, the
state may restrict marital choice even when a fully informed, competent adult
agrees to a multi-person marital arrangement. As noted, the argument from
gender inequality assumes that most legally recognized plural marriages would
be one male and multiple women, but that assumption needs to be backed up
by a better argument. If the state began to accord legal status to a much wider
range of intimate relationships, then women would have more options to
choose from, like an all-female plural marriage or an asexual monogamous
one. It is virtually impossible to know ahead of time what kinds of marriages
people would select if they had true marital freedom. More likely than not,
individual plural marriages would be as diverse, with respect to their
interpersonal dynamics, as the monogamous ones that Americans tend to
romanticize.
Polygamists or plural marriage enthusiasts could be treated as a suspect
class under existing constitutional doctrine. Constitutionally, if plural marriage
enthusiasts qualify as such a class, then the burden of proof falls on the state to
show that it has a substantial or a compelling interest in defining marriage to
exclude multi-person relationships and why the legislative means that it has
chosen directly advance that interest. Such enthusiasts meet at least two of the
three traditional criteria—immutability, a history of discrimination, and
political powerlessness—for extending additional judicial protection in the
form of a heightened standard of review. The criteria “are indicia, not
necessary conditions.”143 Therefore, not all three of them have to be met before
one can conclude that the group qualifies as a suspect or quasi-suspect class.
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NUSSBAUM, supra note 67, at 116.
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1. Immutability
The standard interpretation of immutability is that the trait in question is
unchangeable and, thus, one is not responsible for it.144 Because one cannot
choose one’s race or sex, it would be unfair to discriminate against someone
for something that is beyond her control. However, that line of analysis
encounters the inherent philosophical difficulty of knowing what it means to
choose something, like a religion. Anyone could be asked to change her
deepest religious convictions and convert to the religion of the majority. The
point is not that she could not possibly do so or that it would be hard for her to
adopt a different belief system. Rather, it would be wrong to ask her to do so in
a society, like ours, that tries to protect freedom of conscience. Whether chosen
or not, certain beliefs and the practices that follow from one’s belief system are
central to that person’s identity. Many religious people cannot imagine
themselves as not being a Christian, Jew, Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist. That is
not to say that they have not made any sort of choice or could not possibly
have done otherwise. Rather, it is beside the constitutional point. Similarly, to
refer to her desire to marry more than one person as a whim or preference is to
beg the question against its significance in her life. Not being allowed to marry
at least one person would strike most Americans as a serious injustice. In the
abstract, they appreciate why such a right should not be infringed upon. The
issue is less about whether an identity is chosen, and thus could be rejected,
and more about the unfairness of being disadvantaged because of who she is
and how she wants her life to be.
At the end of the day, it should not matter whether a particular identity is
fixed in the sense that one could not change it even if one desired such a
change. What is crucial is the respect, or at least tolerance, that the person is
entitled to under the Constitution unless it harms others or unreasonably puts
them at risk. The problem with the way in which immutability is usually
conceptualized is that such an approach does not capture the rationale of the
immutability requirement—namely that there is nothing wrong with being a
racial minority, female, or gay. As an example, even if a gay man could alter
his sexual orientation and corresponding identity through therapy or
medication, he should not have to do so any more than an atheist should try to
accept divine entities. Although polygamists are not born that way, being
“poly” is a crucial part of many of their identities, and having a multi-person,
144 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 688 (“The notion is that it is unfair to penalize a person for
characteristics that the person did not choose and that the individual cannot change.”).

DEN OTTER GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

5/27/2015 2:13 PM

THREE MAY NOT BE A CROWD

2025

intimate relationship is morally permissible. It is also critical to keep in mind
that being polygamist or polyamorous is not the same as wanting to have sex
indiscriminately or swing. That characterization—the lifestyle is all about
sex—impairs monogamists’ willingness to take multi-person, intimate
relationships seriously and evaluate the possible advantages. In lumping all of
them together and sexualizing them, critics are trying to delegitimize them. To
assert that marital multiplicity amounts to either behavior is overlooking the
serious personal reasons that religious and nonreligious people may have for
preferring a nonmonogamous arrangement. Even if being poly were not an
immutable characteristic in the traditional sense of the term, it still may be
appropriate to treat it as a sexual orientation for purposes of antidiscrimination
law.145
2. Political Powerlessness
The purpose of this criterion is to try to prevent legislative majorities from
invidiously discriminating against minority groups that cannot defend
themselves in the legislative process. In “Federalist No. 10,” James Madison
not only warns against the dangers of faction but defends a larger republic as
the most promising solution to the problem.146 Very much like
balance-of-power arrangements in realist international-relations theory, the
thought is that no faction will grow too powerful when other factions, out of
self-interest, form coalitions to prevent any faction from achieving hegemony.
Despite Madison’s remarkable insights and the extension of the right to vote to
previously disenfranchised groups over time, it is still possible for legislative
minorities to be dominated repeatedly in the legislative process. Lani Gunier’s
theory of fairness in political representation is designed to give each group
greater influence over the outcomes that matter most to them.147
Because such changes are not forthcoming, notwithstanding their merits, it
seems that the only other plausible alternative is to invite courts to intervene to
prevent legislative majorities from exceeding their constitutional authority.
One way, then, to construe the meaning of “political powerlessness” is to ask
when a particular group has been or is likely to be targeted and needs
additional protection in the form of judicial intervention. Historically, the U.S.
145 See BEDI, supra note 11, at 208–47; Ann E. Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation, 79 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1461 (2011).
146 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
147 LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY (1994).
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Supreme Court’s record of riding to the rescue has been far from impressive.
Under some circumstances, though, a federal court may be able to veto the
discriminatory legislation in question when it is produced by constitutionally
impermissible reasons. In his dissent in Romer, Justice Scalia notoriously
overstated the political influence of gays and lesbians.148 If they have so much
influence, then it is hard to explain why about one-fourth of the states, as of
this writing, still do not allow same-sex couples to marry.149 Some of them fail
to protect sexual minorities from different sorts of discrimination for which
racial minorities and women have legal remedies.150 During the trial in Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, expert witness Gary Segura testified that gays and lesbians
are usually unable to combat the discrimination that they face through political
measures.151 At best, due to demographics, they may have enough political
power proportional to their numbers in a few places. By comparison,
polygamists have even fewer resources. As Eugene Volokh puts it,
“pro-polygamy forces are in a lousy political position.”152 Given the nature of
contemporary public opinion, it may be even easier for a gay or lesbian
individual to out himself or herself than for a straight polygamist or
polyamorist to do so. Even today, almost all Americans would agree that
allowing a competent, fully informed adult marry more than one person
simultaneously is not permissible.153
3. History of Discrimination
The other traditional criterion for treating a minority group as a suspect
class is a history of discrimination. Again, the logic of this criterion is not hard
to grasp. That a minority group has been victimized over an extended period
indicates that lawmakers have not lived up to their constitutional duty to ensure
that the Constitution works for everyone. That gays and lesbians in this country
have been the victims of pervasive discrimination by the state and private
actors is beyond dispute. As noted, it is not productive to make comparative
148

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645–46 (1996).
Marriage Center, supra note 3.
150 See, e.g., Statewide Employment Laws and Policies, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/
state_maps (last visited May 17, 2015) (click on “Select an Issue” and select “Statewide Employment Laws
and Policies”) (showing that nineteen states offer no protection against employment discrimination based on
sexual orientation).
151 BECKER, supra note 26, at 160–61.
152 Eugene Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1155, 1177 (2005).
153 According to a recent Gallup Poll, 90% of Americans believe that the practice of polygamy is
immoral. Lydia Saad, Americans Evenly Divided on Morality of Homosexuality, GALLUP (June 18, 2008),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/108115/Americans-Evenly-Divided-Morality-Homosexuality.aspx.
149
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judgments as if all that matters is which minority group has suffered more than
others. The problem of mistreatment of those who are different probably
characterizes all human societies at all times in all places to a greater or lesser
extent.
Certain kinds of differences seem to trigger stronger public reactions than
others do. Religious minorities often fall into this category, even in a nation
like the United States that is morally, politically, and constitutionally
committed to the free exercise of religion. The most well-known free exercise
cases involve such minorities.154 Mormons (LDS), and especially
Fundamentalist Latter-day Saints (FLDS), have been demonized for their
religious convictions and behaviors.155 FLDS still can be prosecuted for some
of their religiously motivated polygynous practices, and that reality
demonstrates that they continue to experience the sort of stereotyping that
dehumanizes the other. Psychologically, it is probably asking a lot of anyone to
hate the sin and love the sinner—to separate behavior they are convinced in
morally reprehensible from the person who behaves in that way. As in the past,
many Americans still associate plural marriage with Mormonism.156 The
persecution of Mormons for unconventional marital arrangements should not
be papered over on the assumption that it obviously pales in comparison to
what racial and sexual minorities and women have gone through and,
consequently, merits no concern. In the antebellum period, the Republican
Party dubbed polygamy and slavery the “twin relics of barbarism.”157 In 1852,
the same year that it officially endorsed polygamy, Utah legalized slavery.158
Private actors also persecuted Mormons.159 Recently, some journalistic
154 See, e.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990) (involving the use of peyote as part of a
Native American religious practice); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
524 (1993) (involving “practices of the Santeria religion”).
155 See JILL NORGREN & SERENA NANDA, AMERICAN CULTURAL PLURALISM AND LAW 87–104 (3d ed.
2006). In 1882, the Edmunds Act banned polygamy and unlawful cohabitation and set up a federal
commission to administer test oaths compelling voters to swear that they were neither bigamists nor
polygamists. Mormons who refused to take these oaths were barred from public service and voting.
See id. at 89, 91–92. During the 1880s, the federal government prosecuted more than 1,300 Mormons for the
religious practice of polygyny. See id. at 92. In 1887, the Edmunds-Tucker Act disinherited the children of
plural marriages and disenfranchised Mormons who advocated polygamy even when they did not practice it.
See id. at 94. In 1890, due to intense pressure from the federal government, as a condition of statehood for
Utah, the Mormon Church formally repudiated polygamy. See id. at 96.
156 Emens, supra note 2, at 282.
157 SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 55–58 (2002).
158 JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 76 (1988).
159 For a concise description of anti-Mormon legislation, see NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY
OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 112–20 (2000); and GORDON, supra note 157, at 33.
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accounts of FLDS fundamentalism have portrayed its polygynous practices in
the worst possible light.160
F. The Long Shadow of Reynolds
A number of times, the judiciary has substantiated the popular belief that
FLDS polygynous marriage is nothing but an opportunity to harm women and
children. In Reynolds, the Court decided that the Free Exercise Clause does not
protect the practice of plural marriage.161 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice
Morrison Waite conceded that the practice of plural marriage was rooted in
sincere religious convictions but concluded that only beliefs—and not
religiously motivated actions—were constitutionally protected.162 More than a
century has passed and the Court still has not overturned Reynolds.163
Nevertheless, the language of Reynolds—that plural marriage is contrary to
“social duties” and “good order,” and “odious among the northern and western
nations of Europe”—should not be minimized in a morally pluralistic society
that is not supposed to be imposing the sentiments of the majority on those
who refuse to conform.164 As one scholar writes, “The Reynolds [C]ourt both
drew upon and reinforced [a] discourse of racial and cultural superiority of
whites over others, casting the American-born Mormon religion as foreign and
other.”165
This is neither the time nor the place to offer anything like a comprehensive
explanation of the multiple historical causes of anti-polygamist propaganda,
but concerns about racism and religious bigotry should not be dismissed out of
hand. A handful of scholars have argued that polygyny constitutes a solution to
the problem of the lack of marriageable men in certain African-American
communities.166 More recently, opposition to polygyny may be driven by
anti-Muslim feelings as well.167 The Qur’an allows a man to marry as many as
160

See, e.g., JON KRAKAUER, UNDER THE BANNER OF HEAVEN: A STORY OF VIOLENT FAITH (2003).
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1879).
162 Id. at 166.
163 See Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1188–90 (2013) (criticizing the reasoning in Reynolds
but noting that “the Supreme Court has periodically continued to cite Reynolds in Free Exercise cases” and
admitting that the case is “binding on the limited question of any potential free exercise right to the actual
practice of polygamy”).
164 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
165 SARAH SONG, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF MULTICULTURALISM 148–49 (2007).
166 See, e.g., PATRICIA DIXON-SPEAR, WE WANT FOR OUR SISTERS WHAT WE WANT FOR OURSELVES:
AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN WHO PRACTICE POLYGYNY BY CONSENT (2009).
167 See, e.g., POLYGAMY’S RIGHTS AND WRONGS: PERSPECTIVES ON HARM, FAMILY, AND LAW 160
(Gillian Calder & Lori G. Beaman eds., 2014).
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four wives, subject to certain conditions, but does not make it a religious
duty.168 Some advocates of plural marriage remind us that such marriage may
not differ from serial monogamy or habitual infidelity. In the West, without
question, anti-polygamy sentiments are found in the Christian tradition, which
privileges opposite-sex monogamy.169 By 1000 C.E., the practice of polygamy
in Jewish communities was uncommon.170
Beyond marital relationships and their structure, composition, and
dynamics, Americans seem to be preoccupied with sexual behavior and often
condemn unconventional kinds of sexual behavior without making any effort
to understand them. According to Nussbaum, “Americans characteristically
exhibit a lot of anxiety about sexual variety.”171 In trying to discredit same-sex
marriage, conservatives used to rely upon the so-called “unnaturalness” of
same-sex intimate relationships and focused on their sexual aspects, as if
everything else were secondary. No one ever seems to oppose same-sex
marriage on the basis of the wrongfulness of two men having an emotionally
close friendship. Indeed, films like Sideways and television programs like
Entourage celebrate male friendship. If any of the characters were physically
intimate with each other, then many viewers would react differently because
they would see its content as being salacious. Men can be as close as the
closest brothers and hug each other after winning a game. However, the
moment that they engage in sex acts, what was admirable immediately
becomes debased in the eyes of the viewers.
In this sense, opposition to polygamy has something in common with
opposition to homosexuality. In his dissent in Romer, Scalia favorably
compared laws that discriminate against gays and lesbians with those that do
likewise to polygamists.172 For many Americans, same-sex sex acts are
considered deviant. In Nussbaum’s view, “appeal to disgust . . . has been a
crucial part of the antigay strategy.”173 Likewise, most of them frown upon
have multiple sexual partners, and sexual non-exclusivity is one of the defining
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PAREKH, supra note 51, at 282–85.
See JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION,
WESTERN TRADITION 37, 48 (2d ed. 2012).
170 NORMAN SOLOMON, JUDAISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 92 (2d ed. 2014).
171 NUSSBAUM, supra note 67, at 25.
172 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 648 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173 NUSSBAUM, supra note 67, at 8.
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features of some polygamous unions.174 For one political theorist, “[t]he
restriction on polygamy may instead be a case in which allegations of social
instability are used to suppress an unpopular minority whose actions are seen
as morally indecent or corrupt.”175 Another scholar has come up with the term
“polyphobia” to describe prejudice against polygamists and their
relationships.176 The topic of sex makes many Americans uncomfortable.177
They may feel even more uncomfortable with alternative lifestyles that involve
unfamiliar sexual behaviors and threaten well-entrenched norms like
monogamy. Although very few people in this country still believe adultery or
divorce should be illegal, most of them are quick to condemn cheating on
one’s partner, and mere allegations of such behavior on the part of public
figures are always newsworthy. This moral reaction is understandable due to
the deception that infidelity usually involves and the trauma that it causes, yet
such a reaction usually leaves no room for public discussion about whether the
couple has an open marriage or whether having more than one long-term
intimate partner might work better for some persons in some circumstances.
Before Bowers was overturned in 2003,178 it would have been considerably
harder to put together a plausible constitutional argument to support same-sex
marriage. Most contemporary legal academics would place Bowers v.
Hardwick in the category of other notorious decisions like Dred Scott, Plessy
v. Ferguson, and Korematsu.179 Pre-Lawrence, it was not evident whether a
state’s unwillingness to accord legal status to a same-sex marriage would
trigger the analysis found in Bowers or that of Romer, in which the Court held
that animus against gays and lesbians could not qualify as a legitimate state
interest to satisfy the first part of rational basis standard of review.180 In his
dissent in Romer, Justice Scalia chides the justices in the majority for taking a
174 “Polyamory” intimates that members of the group will not necessarily be sexually exclusive only with
one another, whereas “polyfidelity” suggests that the members of the group only will be sexual with other
members. See SHEFF, supra note 74, at 2–4.
175 Kymlicka, supra note 59, at 93–94.
176 BENNION, supra note 17, at 7.
177 See MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE
21 (1999).
178 See Lawerence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
179 See, e.g., Teemu Ruskola, Gay Rights Versus Queer Theory: What Is Left of Sodomy After Lawrence v.
Texas?, SOC. TEXT, Fall–Winter 2005, at 235, 237 (“I too am elated that Hardwick . . . has ended up . . . in the
company of cases such as Dred Scott, Plessy v. Ferguson, Korematsu, and others.”).
180 Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (finding no fundamental right to engage in
consensual homosexual sodomy), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (finding that “a general
announcement that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular protections from the law” does not “bear a
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose”).
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constitutional position that ignores the precedential value of Bowers.181
Fortunately, since 1996, the legal community is not as hostile to the rights of
sexual minorities as it used to be in the sense that lawmakers and private actors
no longer can discriminate against them with impunity. As Andrew
Koppelman writes, “Together, Lawrence and Romer establish a fairly clear
rule: If a law singles out gays for unprecedentedly harsh treatment, the Court
will presume that what is going on is a bare desire to harm, rather than mere
moral disapproval.”182
Nevertheless, polygamists still can be prosecuted for in essence doing what
straight and gay married and unmarried people can do without fear of incurring
criminal liability. Because they could lose their families, friends, jobs, and
even their children in a custody dispute, many polygamists and polyamorists
are frightened to come out of the closet.183 In some jurisdictions, they could
face criminal charges.184 There are many traumatic life experiences that human
beings may have to go through, but one of them, which ought to be near the
top of the list, concerns the burden of having to hide who one is for fear of how
others will react if they knew the truth. This point would not be lost on anyone
who is a sexual minority in America and feels like she has to live a double life.
The constitutional importance of Romer cannot be underestimated because,
like many important constitutional cases, it can be read narrowly or broadly.
The decision could stand for the proposition that the judges must be more
skeptical of the rationale advanced by the state in defense of a legislative
classification whose constitutionality is being disputed. Of course, when a
suspect group is being put at a legal disadvantage, it may be difficult to
ascertain whether the intent that underlies the law in question is invidious.
The principal disagreement between Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia in
Romer centered on how to describe properly why the voters of Colorado had
approved Amendment 2: that is, whether the voters where driven by animus
against gays and lesbians. This disagreement resurfaces in Windsor. In his
dissent in Windsor, Justice Scalia complains about the implication of the
majority opinion that he and others like him who continue to oppose same-sex
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Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640–43 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE
LINES 78 (2006).
183 On the risks of this sort of coming out, see TRISTAN TAORMINO, OPENING UP: A GUIDE TO CREATING
AND SUSTAINING OPEN RELATIONSHIPS 229–31 (2008).
184 Most states treat polygamy as a felony but some of them treat it as a misdemeanor. Slark, supra
note 56, at 453 & nn.18–19.
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marriage are bigots.185 That complaint would have merit if it were legitimate to
(a) morally disapprove of same-sex relationships in the first place, and
(b) express that disapproval in law by doing what Amendment 2 did by
functioning as an anti-antidiscrimination measure in not only taking away the
protection of local ordinances but also making it considerably more difficult
for such measures to be enacted in the future. Many opponents of same-sex
marriage have not stopped endeavoring to preserve what they see as the
traditional meaning of marriage and sincerely believe that the redefinition of
marriage will produce adverse consequences. If that is the case, irrespective of
whether marriage is deinstitutionalized as a growing number of states allow
gays and lesbians to marry their partners, then not everyone who opposes
same-sex marriage could be automatically labeled a homophobe. Perhaps not
every voter in California who voted for Proposition 8 in 2008 had homophobic
reasons for doing so. Andrew Koppelman asserts that “more recent legislative
initiatives . . . do not necessarily reflect a desire to harm gay people as such, or
even a disrespectful devaluation of their interests.”186 By contrast, during the
trial in Perry, Judge Vaugh Walker was less generous in questioning the
strength of the state’s interests. Whether one gives those who voted for either
Amendment 2 or Proposition 8 the benefit of the doubt with respect to the
constitutional legitimacy of their individual reasons for voting the way that
they did comes down to the considerations that are most relevant and have the
most weight, and reasonable persons might differ about their relevance and
weight. Even if same-sex sex acts and relationships can legitimately be morally
disapproved of, in not redefining marriage to include same-sex couples, such
couples are asked to pay the costs of preserving a particular conception of
marriage.
Anyone who wants to maintain the symbolic meaning of monogamous,
opposite-sex marriage by excluding gays and lesbians from the institution is
demanding that they make a considerable sacrifice that he or she probably
would not be willing to make himself or herself. After all, there are numerous
other culprits to blame when it comes to undermining monogamous,
opposite-sex marriage, yet opponents of same-sex marriage have no intention
to target those who divorce. At most, they may favor the option of covenant
marriage or other measures that might make it more difficult for a couple to
divorce. They certainly do not want to eliminate no-fault divorce or prosecute
185

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2708–09 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Andrew Koppelman, Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare Desire to Harm,” 64 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1045, 1052 (2014).
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those who are unfaithful to their marital partners. It may be true that the vast
majority of straight people who oppose same-sex marriage are uncomfortable
with same-sex relations. But like Scalia did in his dissent in Romer, one could
argue that those who voted for Amendment 2 were not homophobic.187 Rather,
they were expressing their genuine moral disapprobation of gays and lesbians
and same-sex relationships in the midst of a cultural war. In doing so, they
would be assuming that it is legitimate to morally disapprove of
homosexuality. However, their doing so may call into question the
constitutionality of the law that they helped bring into being. As Koppelman
puts it, “The constitutional status of laws that discriminate against gays . . . is
uncertain after Romer.”188 That situation results from the lack of clarity
concerning the kinds of reasons that the state may offer in support of its view
that sexual orientation can be a relevant difference in treating gays and lesbians
differently. Windsor makes clear that the state cannot treat married gays and
lesbians differently with respect to federal marital benefits when such
differential treatment is rooted in a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular
group.189 In Windsor, Kennedy did not simply rely on Romer but instead
extended its rationale in the direction of marital equality.
In 2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the U.S. Supreme Court finally may end
the controversy over whether the Constitution requires states to allow same-sex
couples to marry.190 The prospects of a victory for those who have fought for
marriage equality for gays and lesbians look even better than they did in
2013.191 As of this writing, only thirteen states refuse to permit a man to marry
another man or a woman to marry another woman.192 In the aftermath of
Windsor, the same-sex marriage advocates have prevailed in most of the lower
courts. The Sixth Circuit decision that the Supreme Court decided to review
has the dubious distinction of being the only case in the last two years in which
the other side has had success.193 The rapid change in circumstances makes it
187 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Of course it is our moral heritage
that one should not hate any human being or class of human beings. But I had thought that one could consider
certain conduct reprehensible—murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to animals—and could exhibit
even ‘animus’ toward such conduct.”).
188 ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 7 (2002).
189 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
190 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039, 1040 (2015) (mem.).
191 See Ilya Somin, Same-Sex Marriage Returns to the Supreme Court – And Its Prospects Look Good,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/
16/same-sex-marriage-returns-to-the-supreme-court-and-its-prospects-look-good/.
192 Marriage Center, supra note 3.
193 Somin, supra note 191.
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much easier for a majority of justices to minimize their worries about backlash
and make martial equality for gays and lesbians a constitutional reality.
G. Animus
In Obergefell, the Court will have to revisit the debate between Kennedy
and Scalia over how to characterize the reasons that states fall back upon to
justify treating opposite-sex couples so much more favorably regarding
marriage. States cannot simply point to the fact that a practice has existed for a
long time. Recently, Judge Richard Posner took the states of Indiana and
Wisconsin to task in a same-sex marriage case for selectively interpreting the
tradition of marriage.194 The doctrine of animus is judicially
underdeveloped.195 That may change over time as legal scholars explicate its
meaning; investigate the possible broader precedential impact of cases like
Romer, Windsor, and maybe Obergefell; say more about how it can be
identified; and influence the thinking of the legal community. The
underdeterminacy of the case law with respect to the meaning of animus may
be a blessing in disguise for those who seek to use it in the future to protect
other discrete and insular minorities from being disadvantaged by the law.
What is sincere moral disapproval for Scalia is animus against a sexual
minority for Kennedy. The description of the state’s interest, then, will
determine its legitimacy and whether the legislative classification at issue
passes rational basis.
For instance, not permitting interracial couples to marry or cohabitate only
could be rationalized by a false belief of white supremacy.196 These days, it
would be hard to find a judge who would allow the state to enact legislation
designed to convey the message that one racial group is superior. A white
supremacist does not have to hate racial minorities and want them to be
murdered, even though some white supremacists surely do want this state of
affairs to come about. While some readers may object to the comparison of
interracial and same-sex marriage, those who have been denied the right to
marriage on the basis of their sexual orientation may have been denied that
right on the basis of a characteristic that is just as arbitrary as race is. Justice
Kennedy begins his majority opinion in Romer by comparing racial
194

Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 2014).
See Susannah W. Pollvogt, Balkanization Symposium on Unconstitutional Animus—Collected Posts,
BALKANIZATION (Oct. 8, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/search?q=“Symposium+on+
Unconstitutional+Animus”.
196 ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 109.
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discrimination to discrimination based on sexual orientation.197 This view is
becoming more prevalent. If more Americans can at least imagine that the
state’s failures to permit both kinds of marriage—same-sex and plural,
regardless of its gender composition—are morally and legally equivalent, then
they also might entertain the possibility that animus underlies laws that do not
allow same-sex couples to marry. Even under rational basis review, lawmakers
and voters may not act on such a basis.
For a judge to decide whether such animus exists in a given case, she must
not only make a factual judgment about the totality of the circumstances in
which the law in question was engendered but also make a moral judgment
about what animus means. Legal reasoning never can be strictly deductive,
which means that the exercise of constitutional judgment requires both factual
and normative evaluations, neither of which is likely to prove uncontroversial
in important constitutional cases. Animus is an interpretive concept, and it is
safe to assert that it is not synonymous with hatred or a desire to harm others.
If animus is to be interpreted in this way, it would be an extremely rare law
that would be tainted in that way. It would require that the court shift the
burden of proof from the parties challenging the law to the state defending the
law to show that those who enacted the law had additional, legitimate reasons
for doing so. In his dissent in Romer, Justice Scalia goes so far as to assert that
the voters are entitled to be hostile towards gays and lesbians.198 His meaning
seems to be that they can express their moral disapproval of same-sex sexual
relations by singling out gays, lesbians, and bisexuals for unfavorable
treatment. Although the precise meaning of “animus” is disputed, many legal
scholars and judges believe that a legislative majority may not act on the basis
of certain reasons, namely those rooted in malice.199 In Windsor, Justice
Kennedy referred to “discrimination of an unusual character” and later in his
majority opinion mentions that which is designed to disparage and injure.200
According to Dale Carpenter, the “[a]nimus doctrine constitutionalizes [the]
basic precept” that “one should not hate any human being or class of human
beings.”201 “Hate” is a strong word, and almost all of those who reject
same-sex marriage would resist the characterization of their continuing
197

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996).
Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
199 See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 61, at 185.
200 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693, 2696 (2013) (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
201 Carpenter, supra note 61, at 185 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal
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opposition to it as having anything to do with hatred. Just because they do not
see the connection, however, does not mean that it does not exist. When a
white supremacist insists that he does not hate African-Americans, for
example, most of us will take what he has said with a large grain of salt. If only
hatred is synonymous with malice for constitutional purposes, then the
problem in Equal Protection cases lies less in the inappropriateness of the
subjective motivation for voting for, say, Amendment 2, Proposition 8, or
Section 3 of DOMA, and more in the failure to treat the minority group at issue
fairly. Even Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissent in Windsor, stated that it was
constitutionally impermissible to “codify malice.”202
The issue, then, is what such malice amounts to. At some point, when legal
professionals have to apply the law to real fact patterns and legal scholars have
to meet deadlines, the process of making fine conceptual distinctions must
come to an end. Given what is known about the flaws of the legislative
process, constitutionally, it makes at least some sense to see animus as a
nonpublic reason: that is, a reason that reasonable persons would not and could
not share as justification for unequal treatment. According to Bedi, “[T]he
Equal Protection Clause is best understood . . . as a limit on the kinds of
reasons government may invoke.”203 Coupled with Lawrence, which
disqualifies mere moral disapproval as a public reason, and in the absence of
harm to others, the state is under a constitutional obligation to put forth a better
rationale for the law then that it reinforces the moral impermissibility of
same-sex sex acts or relations. If a court is going to uphold the law, then the
justification that its defenders offer on its behalf cannot involve a moral
judgment that expresses the view that being straight is better than all
alternative lifestyles. In other words, animus rules out moral opposition to
same-sex marriage as a rationale for unequal treatment. That such opposition
can be traced to a religious source is neither here nor there. In 2015, few of us
would care about the origins of the religious reasons that a person might have
for being against interracial marriage, notwithstanding the sincerity of such
beliefs. The conclusion would be that animus underlies the opposition, which
is to say that the moral disapproval expressed is inappropriate. After all, that
sort of relationship is morally unobjectionable. By contrast, if an individual
were to morally condemn how her neighbor abuses her intimate partner, then

202 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Carpenter, supra note 61, at 189
(“Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, implicitly agreed that it is unconstitutional to ‘codify malice’ . . . .”).
203 BEDI, supra note 11, at 20.
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his moral approval would be warranted in a manner in which such opposition
to an interracial couple never could.
If opposition to same-sex marriage more closely resembles opposition to
interracial couples, as opposed to the above neighbor’s poor treatment of her
intimate partner, then the state’s interest is not legitimate. In his dissent in
Windsor, Justice Scalia takes the same tack that he did in Romer by denying
that animus explains why members of Congress passed DOMA.204 However,
according to Koppelman, even “extreme indifference is a constitutional harm
that has a remedy.”205 Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor lay the foundation for a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage because it is reasonable to infer from
them that none of the reasons that lawmakers or voters could use to defend
only allowing opposite-sex couples to be eligible for marriage licenses are
adequate. Likewise, one might be equally doubtful of the interests that states
have in keeping polygamy illegal.206 Although the focus of this Article is not
decriminalization, the reasons that states usually give for continuing to
criminalize polygamy also bear on not allowing competent adults to marry
more than one person at the same time. The most obvious way to ensure that
states provide the option of plural marriage is to formulate an equal protection
argument to support the constitutional conclusion that the state cannot favor
monogamous marriages over plural ones by only licensing the former.
As noted, to do so would be to show that a state’s only giving marriage
licenses to couples, opposite or same sex, triggers a heightened standard of
review. Even if such a law only is subject to rational basis, the state still lacks a
legitimate interest in privileging monogamous marital relationships. Either
way, the basic constitutional strategy would be to show that the state’s interests
in not broadening the definition of marriage are much weaker than individuals’
interests in having a wider range of martial options and cannot withstand
scrutiny. The state is not supposed to use its power to validate heterosexuality.
Similarly, it is not supposed to dictate which way of living or marriage is most
conducive to human flourishing. The Equal Protection Clause sets parameters
for the exercise of political power by not enabling the states to treat different
groups differently unless they can successfully defend such treatment. The
traditional “tiers-of-scrutiny” do not give much guidance about when a
rationale is unsatisfactory.207 Thus, judges have considerable discretion in
204
205
206
207

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2707–11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Koppelman, supra note 186, at 1068.
Expert Report, supra note 58, para. 132.
See BEDI, supra note 11, at 4.
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determining the strength of the state’s interests. This fact helps to explain why
strict in theory is not always fatal in fact. A public-reasons approach can be
employed to decide when the state has exceeded its constitutional authority
when it makes legislative classifications.208 Such an approach is not perfect, of
course, yet it helps the decisionmaker focus on what is most important for the
legal analysis, namely the reasons that the state offers as justification for why it
did what it did.
The anti-animus principle that emerges from Windsor calls upon judges to
assess the quality of the state’s reasons for discriminating. Deciding whether a
particular law is sufficiently motivated by animus, understood as having the
wrong motive, is bound to be complicated more often than not in the midst of
so many possible motives. That does not mean that animus is in the eye of the
beholder. In the context of racial discrimination, for example, nobody still
believes that Jim Crow laws were not driven by what contemporary Americans
would call animus. A finding of animus may shift the burden of proof to the
state to show that it has other, more widely acceptable reasons for treating one
group differently than another, or it may be fatal to the law in question. This
sort of analysis appears in the Hollingsworth and Windsor litigation, where the
judges did not take the state’s asserted interest at face value. Instead, they
questioned the sincerity of the reasons offered on behalf of laws that
discriminated against same-sex couples because they provided little, if any,
support. According to Carpenter, “the flimsiness of these justifications
reinforces the conclusion that the law was infected by animus.”209 The
reasoning is something like this: when lawmakers put forth reasons that are so
bad, they probably are insincere. Their insincerity suggests that they have other
reasons that they are trying to conceal. They would not conceal them unless
they were suspect.
If animus, understood as a lack of sufficiently public reasons for a law,
explains why all states limit marriage to couples, then states may be
constitutionally required to make marriage as inclusive as possible. As noted, it
may be easier to know the difference between moral disapproval in the abstract
than in actual cases. This is where a public-reasons approach proves its worth
because it tells the judge to reject reasons that the state advances when those

208 Elsewhere, I described same-sex marriage as an easy case because those who oppose it have been
unable put forth such reasons. See DEN OTTER, supra note 24, at 245–61.
209 Carpenter, supra note 61, at 192.
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reasons are too sectarian to serve as the basis of a law. As Judge Walker wrote
in Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
Whether [the] belief is based on moral disapproval of homosexuality,
animus towards gays and lesbians or simply a belief that a
relationship between a man and a woman is inherently better than a
relationship between two men or two women, this belief is not a
proper basis on which to legislate.210

As a result, the judge’s job is at least somewhat easier because he or she can
strike down a law that is premised upon a conception of the good. The state
may not take away the option of a plural marriage from plural marriage
enthusiasts unless it has sufficient public reasons for doing so. This Article has
elaborated on why those reasons do not exist. Legislators cannot simply cite
the “fact” that monogamy is superior or that the public believes it to be so any
more than it can defend not permitting a man to marry another man or a
woman to marry another woman on the ground that their intimate relationships
are intrinsically inferior to a heterosexual relationship. After all, they are not,
and even if it were proved that they were so beyond a shadow of a doubt, the
state still cannot rely on such a rationale.
Constitutionally, the issue comes down to who should decide and not
whether any decision to marry is wise. The lives of plural marriage enthusiasts
are just as important as those of who prefer monogamy. Unnecessary
numerical restrictions make it harder for them to have kind of life that for them
is most fulfilling. While to some supporters of same-sex marriage,
discrimination against such enthusiasts may seem comparatively trivial, that
belief does not change the fact that the state does not have to treat polygamists
and polyamorists unequally when it comes to marriage. At the end of the day,
the constitutionality of any restriction on whom one may marry is a function of
the quality of the reasons that the state puts forth.211 The more heightened the
standard of review, the better those reasons have to be. When they turn out to
be unsatisfactory, a court is supposed to find the law, which infringes on a
fundamental right or treats a suspect class unequally, to be unconstitutional.
Those who care about treating everyone fairly must be aware of how easy it is
to not notice that a minority group has been invidiously discriminated against.
Because the distinction between same-sex and plural marriage is a distinction
without a constitutional difference, they merit the same legal treatment.
210

Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
See generally BEDI, supra note 11; DEN OTTER, supra note 24 (providing extensive reasoning to
counter the traditional state arguments on these and other issues).
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VI. CONSEQUENCES
Those who hope real marital freedom and equality will come into being
someday in this country may not witness anything close to such a change in
their lifetimes. Radical constitutional positions do not gain adherents
overnight. The social environment in which such change could take place has
to be conducive to elite and especially public opinion shifting away from a
deeply ingrained belief that monogamy is superior. With rare exceptions,
courts tend to acknowledge the soundness of constitutional arguments only
when the timing is right.212 Unfortunately, such arguments only receive the
attention that they deserve in an atmosphere where the public is more tolerant
of difference. At some point, the willingness of more and more Americans not
to summarily dismiss the very idea of marital multiplicity may start a discourse
about the best meaning of marital equality. Their willingness may prompt them
to consider that a plural marriage might work better for some people in some
circumstances and perhaps conclude, as this Article has tried to show, that the
Constitution requires states to allow polygamists and polyamorists to marry. A
constitutional argument can be sound, yet it also must be recognized as such by
the legal community prior to its being able to influence the outcome of real
cases. The constitutional litigation regarding same-sex marriage nicely
illustrates this point.213
As of this writing, though, no state has decriminalized polygamy and no
state is on the verge of doing so.214 DOMA not only discriminates against
same-sex couples but also against all polygamous unions.215 The constitutional
conclusion that this Article argues for—that states that only legally recognize
two-person marital unions are acting unconstitutionally—probably strikes a
considerable number of readers as a product of the worst kind of utopian
theorizing. Those who have that reaction should keep in mind that the
improbability of any sort of legal recognition of marital multiplicity in the
foreseeable future does not imply that the idea lacks constitutional merit or that
its time will never come. In the late eighteenth century, the abolition of slavery
212 See Michael L. Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1011, 1014–15, 1024 (2007).
213 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 19–20 (2013).
214 Although the District Court for the District of Utah recently declared the cohabitation language in
Utah’s bigamy statute unconstitutional, Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013), no state has,
by popular or legislative initiative, taken steps to decriminalize polygamy.
215 Martha M. Ertman, Race Treason: The Untold Story of America’s Ban on Polygamy, 19 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 287, 357–62 (2010).
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and the enfranchisement of women were unrealistic. Above all, even when the
reader continues to be skeptical, which is understandable, this Article assumes
that he or she can conceptualize a possible world where states do not disrespect
plural marriage enthusiasts. The scholarly treatment of many interesting and
important theoretical constitutional questions would become sidetracked if
scholars always were caught up in practical questions about feasibility. For
example, a number of prominent legal scholars, especially those on the left
these days, have made the case for limiting the role of the U.S. Supreme Court
or eliminating judicial review.216 In 2015, neither change to the status quo is
terribly realistic in the sense that Americans can be expected to embrace it. If
anything, judicial review probably will become even more entrenched given
the current dysfunction of the federal government and judicial trends in other
developed democracies. In short, one should not respond to the question of
whether the practice of judicial review by federal courts makes good normative
sense only by trying to calculate the probability of the change and how such a
proposal could be institutionalized.217
Likewise, practical questions never should dominate the constitutional
discussion of plural marriage to the point where nobody cares about the
soundness of the arguments. This is neither the time nor the place to defend
ideal theory and its role in either political or constitutional thought. But, this
Article presupposes the utility of a scholarly division of labor in which
assessing the soundness of a constitutional argument cannot be equated with
the likelihood of its being implemented within the next few decades. American
constitutional history indicates that at least some resistance to any
more-than-trivial change in constitutional meaning is inevitable. The institution
of marriage will continue to evolve, and those who reject those changes will
insist that the future is dark. There was a time when almost all Americans
would not have worried about a conception of marriage that by contemporary
standards would be not only racist but also misogynistic. At the founding, most
of them probably would not have viewed an even lower age of consent for
marriage or for sexual relations as problematic. After the Civil War, surely
Americans would not have fathomed that our Constitution could force states to
permit members of the same gender to marry each other.218
216

See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 271–75, 297–98 (2014).
At least one legal scholar believes that family law could accommodate marital multiplicity quite easily
MARK GOLDFEDER, LEGALIZING PLURAL MARRIAGE: THE NEXT FRONTIER IN FAMILY LAW (forthcoming
2015) (manuscript at 161–62).
218 See Orin Kerr, Is There an Originalist Case for a Right to Same-Sex Marriage?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
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It should be more difficult, then, to summarily dismiss any proposed reform
due to its being alleged to be too radical or ridiculously utopian. When the law
is unsettled and the timing is optimal, legal professionals can put together
arguments that justify the outcome they desire. In constitutional controversies,
public opinion can shift rapidly.219 American constitutional experience
demonstrates that divining our future is fraught with difficulties. Some
constitutional understandings, which the legal community used to consider
far-fetched, are now widely accepted.220 As noted, twenty years ago, the view
that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry would not have been
taken seriously.221 Recent political rhetoric about the family has oversimplified
its complicated history.222 Marriage never has and never will have a universal
meaning. In some places and at some times, it has reinforced notions of racial,
gender, and religious supremacy.223 One of the worst mistakes that anyone can
make, when it comes to arguing for a particular normative view of what
marriage should be, is to conceal its checkered past. In fact, the idea of
(monogamous) same-sex marriage is more unprecedented than polygyny in
human history.224
The vast majority of Americans reject plural marriage.225 As a result, those
who want states to diversify marriage must persuade ordinary Americans, their
elected representatives, and judges to view plural marriage as morally
permissible under certain conditions so that polygamists and polyamorists are
treated equally. The truth is that understanding and compassion do not come to
most of us easily. At present, the chances that advocates of same-sex marriage
will align themselves with those who support the legal recognition of plural
marriage are small. Any conversation about the merits of plural marriage may
originalist-case-for-a-right-to-same-sex-marriage/; Orin Kerr, More on Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/
29/more-on-originalism-and-same-sex-marriage/. But see Ilya Somin, Originalism is Broad Enough to Include
Arguments for a Constitutional Right to Same-Sex Marriage, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 28, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/28/originalism-is-broad-enough-toinclude-arguments-for-a-constitutional-right-to-same-sex-marriage/.
219 According to a recent Pew Center poll, 14% of Americans surveyed proclaimed that they had changed
their minds in favor of permitting same-sex marriage. Public Voices on Same-Sex Marriage, Homosexuality,
PEW RES. CTR. (June 6, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/06/06/homosexuality-opinion.
220 See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
221 KLARMAN, supra note 213, at 19.
222 STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP
(1992).
223 COTT, supra note 159, at 4–5.
224 GOLDFEDER, supra note 217 (manuscript at 88–94).
225 Supra note 153.
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be premature when the American public still is divided over same-sex
marriage.226 In 2013, the United States Supreme Court failed to take advantage
of two opportunities to recognize a constitutional right to same-sex marriage
(or its equivalent on equal protection grounds).227 However, recently, the Court
granted certiorari in such a case.228 So far, no state has recognized any sort of
plural marriage.229 Nor will any legislature or court do so in the foreseeable
future. In 2007, the Court declined to hear such a case.230 At most, the
decriminalization of polygamy in some states may be off in the distance. The
extension of the constitutional right of marriage beyond couples appears to be
something that most Americans are not ready for.
It is possible that this situation will not remain stagnant as time passes,
particularly when those who are unsympathetic to marital multiplicity resist the
temptation to reduce it to the most egregious sorts of polygyny to score
rhetorical points. The American public might not be so adamantly opposed to
plural marriage if it were better informed about its variations. There was a time
in our not-so-distant past when nearly all Americans would have drawn upon
the most pernicious stereotypes to deny treating gays and lesbians fairly.
Television programs like TLC’s Sister Wives and HBO’s Big Love can
continue to humanize polygynists and in doing so, make the unfamiliar more
familiar. American attitudes toward sexuality and marriage have evolved, and
it is no longer as easy as it once was for Americans to know “normal” when
they see it. Alternatives lifestyles are a more visible phenomenon than they
used to be, and their increased visibility may induce more Americans to be less
dogmatic about the morality and constitutionality of numerical restrictions. For
the most part, though, Americans do not discuss plural marriage fairly, as if the
topic was not worthy of anyone’s time. It may be wishful thinking to expect
less hostility and more charity in the near future, but anti-plural-marriage
views may become less prominent as more people become more curious about
what they are really like and begin to see that discrimination against plural
marriage enthusiasts is akin or at least similar to discriminating against gays,
226 McCarthy, supra note 10; Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CENTER (Sept. 24, 2014),
http://www.pewforum.org/2014/09/24/graphics-slideshow-changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/ (poll finding
that 52% of Americans support same-sex marriage).
227 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (reviewing the Second Circuit’s decision to
invalidate part of DOMA); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (reviewing the Ninth’s Circuit’s
decision to invalidate California’s Proposition 8 and deciding that on appeal, the petitioners lacked standing to
challenge the District Court’s order to enjoin the enforcement of Proposition 8).
228 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039, 1040 (2015) (mem.).
229 KOPPELMAN, supra note 182, at 30–31.
230 Holm v. Utah, 549 U.S. 1252 (2007) (mem.).
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lesbians, and other sexual minorities. The time may come when such marital
discrimination is no longer socially acceptable as more Americans come to
realize that their friends, coworkers, and neighbors want nonmonogamous
marital arrangements or want to experiment with them. Some polygamists
already are coming out of the closet, despite the legal risks of doing so. It is
time for our society to stop marginalizing them and start treating them as
equals.
CONCLUSION
This purpose of this Article has been not only to survey the constitutional
landscape in search of rationales in support of a right to plural marriage or its
equivalent on equal protection grounds. It also takes a normative position by
embracing marital diversity and contending that as long as the state remains in
the marriage business, it must legally recognize any intimate relationship that
competent, consenting adults want to form, regardless of its number, gender
composition, or interpersonal dynamics, provided that the behaviors do not
violate other valid laws. This conclusion finds considerable constitutional
support in the meanings of substantive due process, understood as the value of
martial choice, and equal protection, understood as identical legal treatment in
the absence of sufficient justification for the contrary. When all is said and
done, the state’s interests in denying marital choice are weak. From the
standpoint of the Constitution, the meaning of marriage ought to lie in the eye
of the beholder. The state should not be trying to save competent adults from
what may turn out to be poor marital choices when a substantial majority of
states allow couples to marry for just about any personal reason that they
happen to have. Additionally, some states let minors marry with parental
consent.231 When someone is being physically abused, then without question,
the state can intervene. But there is a world of constitutional difference
between preventing such harm and infringing upon the personal choice only of
plural marriage enthusiasts in the name of an ideal of internal equality that
many couples do not live up to or even care about. Like everyone else, such
enthusiasts have lives to lead. Sooner rather than later, Americans must ask
themselves whether such unequal treatment is constitutionally tolerable in a
society that is supposed to respect the freedom and equality of all of its
members.

231
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As this Article explains, the understandable preoccupation with same-sex
marriage in the midst of ongoing legal discrimination against gays and lesbians
in many states should not come at the expense of excluding a wide variety of
multi-person intimate relationships, opposite or same-sex. It should not matter
that polygamists and polyamorists do not yet have the resources to advance
their agenda or that their being nonmonogamous may often not be as central to
their self-understanding as sexual orientation is for most gays and lesbians in a
society that continues to make so much of their difference. At this moment, the
numbers are neither here nor there. The fate of legal recognition of plural
marriage should not turn on whether it enjoys as much popular support as
same-sex marriage. The cause of marriage equality, then, could be less
sectarian and more about ending all forms of marital discrimination.
Americans inhabit a place in which polygamous relationships exist, and
that state of affairs is not going to change in the near future. In attempting to
discern whether the current legal definition in all states is underinclusive and
therefore both morally unenlightened and constitutionally objectionable, this
Article endeavors to start a conversation that is long overdue. After all,
everyone has the right to be treated fairly under the Constitution, even when
they have different conceptions about what kind of intimacy is most important
to them. The voters or their elected representatives often are not equipped to
make such judgments for such discrete and insular minorities. Indeed, that
intolerant attitude is partially responsible for the misery that many minorities
experience because of their difference. In a pluralistic society, considerable
variance in ways of life is to be expected. The lives of polygamists and
polyamorists not only count but count equally. As a result, they must be
allowed to marry everyone who wants to marry them unless a marriage
becomes so large that it is administratively unmanageable. The point is not that
multi-partner relationships are for everyone or even for most adults.
Polyamorists are vocal about how challenging they tend to be. Rather, it is that
such a decision is best left to the individuals most directly affected by how
their intimate lives are structured.
Someday, there may be a U.S. Supreme Court decision for plural marriage
enthusiasts that would do for them what Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor are
doing to improve the lives of gays and lesbians in this country. While courts do
not initiate invidious discrimination, they can constitutionalize it by permitting
it. Eventually, some lawmakers and judges may be more critical of the
rationale for continuing to criminalize the mere act of being “married” to more
than one adult simultaneously and more willing to acknowledge that
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regulation, as opposed to prohibition, is not only fair but more humane and
effective at addressing crimes associated with certain polygynous
arrangements. As it stands, women in illegal, polygynous relationships are
vulnerable in multiple ways. However, a change in thinking may pave the way
for evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against the
constitutional right to plural marriage more objectively. As circumstances
change, what was at one point an almost inconceivable constitutional view
may become more plausible.
When it comes to marriage, then, the state does not have to define marriage
in a needlessly narrow way that is predicated on the dubious claims that some
kinds of marriages are intrinsically superior and produce better overall
consequences. The decision not to marry, to marry only one person, or to
marry multiple persons simultaneously can be left to individuals who may have
very different perspectives on the meaning of marriage, how it should be
configured, its dynamics, and its place in their lives. The quality of any
personal relationship, including marriage, is bound to be a product of its
particulars. All of the well-known objections made against multi-person
intimate relationships can be made against same- or opposite-sex monogamy
as well, resulting in an indefensible double standard. Sadly, many two-person
intimate relationships are dysfunctional, and a closer, more brutally honest
look at them should not inspire confidence in their superiority. Americans do
not have to internalize this double standard, family law does not have to
incorporate it, lawmakers do not have to put up with it, and judges do not have
to put their imprimatur on it.

